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Theoretical procedures are developed to account for the effect of emotion and perception in 
strategic conflict. The possibility principle facilitates modeling the effects of emotions on 
future scenarios contemplated by decision makers; perceptual graph models and a graph 
model system permit the decision makers (DMs) to experience and view the conflict 
independently; and perceptual stability analysis, which is based on individual- and meta-
stability analysis techniques, is employed in analyzing graph model systems when the DMs 
have inconsistent perceptions. These developments improve the methodology of the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution by reconciling emotion, perception, and strategy to make 
predictions consistent with the actual unfolding of events.   
Current research in neuroscience suggests that emotions are a necessary component of 
cognitive processes such as memory, attention, and reasoning. The somatic marker 
hypothesis, for example, holds that feelings are necessary to reasoning, especially during 
social interactions (Damasio, 1994, 2003). Somatic markers are memories of past emotions: 
we use them to predict future outcomes. To incorporate the effect of emotion in conflict, the 
underlying principle of Damasio’s hypothesis is used in developing the possibility principle, 
which significantly expands the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution of 
Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour (1993).  
State identification is a crucial step in determining future scenarios for DMs. The 
possibility principle is integrated into the modeling stage of the Graph Model by refining the 
method of determining feasible states. The possibility principle enables analysts and DMs to 
include emotion in a conflict model, without sacrificing the parsimonious design of the 
Graph Model methodology, by focusing attention on two subsets of the set of feasible states: 
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hidden and potential states. Hidden states are logically valid, feasible states that are invisible 
because of the presence of negative emotions such as anger and fear; potential states are 
logically valid, feasible states that are invisible because of missing positive emotions. 
Dissipating negative emotions will make the hidden states visible, while expressing the 
appropriate positive emotions will make the potential states visible. The possibility principle 
has been applied to a number of real world conflicts. In all cases, eliminating logically valid 
states not envisioned by any DM simplifies a conflict model substantially, expedites the 
analysis, and makes it an intuitive and a realistic description of the DMs’ conceptualizations 
of the conflict. 
A fundamental principle of the Graph Model methodology is that all DMs’ directed 
graphs must have the same set of feasible states, which are integrated into a standard graph 
model. The possibility principle may modify the set of feasible states perceived by each DM 
according to his or her emotion, making it impossible to construct a single standard graph 
model. When logically valid states are no longer achievable for one or more DMs due to 
emotions, the apprehension of conflict becomes inconsistent, and resolution may become 
difficult to predict. Therefore, reconciling emotion and strategy requires that different 
apprehensions of the underlying decision problem be permitted, which can be accomplished 
using a perceptual graph model for each DM. A perceptual graph model inherits its primitive 
ingredients from a standard graph model, but reflects a DM’s emotion and perception with no 
assumption of complete knowledge of other DMs’ perceptions.     
  Each DM’s perceptual graph model constitutes a complete standard graph model. 
Hence, conclusions drawn from a perceptual graph model provide a limited view of 
equilibria and predicted resolutions. A graph model system, which consists of a list of DMs’ 
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perceptual graph models, is defined to reconcile perceptions while facilitating conclusions 
that reflect each DM’s viewpoint. However, since a DM may or may not be aware that other 
graph models differ from his or her own, different variants of graph model systems are 
required to describe conflicts. Each variant of graph model system corresponds to a 
configuration of awareness, which is a set of ordered combinations of DMs’ viewpoints.   
Perceptual stability analysis is a new procedure that applies to graph model systems.  Its 
objective is to help an outside analyst predict possible resolutions, and gauge the robustness 
and sustainability of these predictions. Perceptual stability analysis takes a two-phase 
approach. In Phase 1, the stability of each state in each perceptual graph model is assessed 
from the point of view of the owner of the model, for each DM in the model, using standard 
or perceptual solution concepts, depending on the owner’s awareness of others’ perceptions. 
(In this research, only perceptual solution concepts for the 2-decision maker case are 
developed.) In Phase 2, meta-stability analysis is employed to consolidate the stability 
assessments of a state in all perceptual graph models and across all variants of awareness. 
Distinctive modes of equilibria are defined, which reflect incompatibilities in DMs’ 
perceptions and viewpoints but nonetheless provide important insights into possible 
resolutions of conflict. 
The possibility principle and perceptual stability analysis are integrative techniques that 
can be used as a basis for empathetically studying the interaction of emotion and reasoning in 
the context of strategic conflict. In general, these new techniques expand current modeling 
and analysis capabilities, thereby facilitating realistic, descriptive models without exacting 
too great a cost in modeling complexity. In particular, these two theoretical advances 
 
  vi
enhance the applicability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to real-world disputes 
by integrating emotion and perception, common ingredients in almost all conflicts.   
To demonstrate that the new developments are practical, two illustrative applications to 
real-world conflicts are presented: the US-North Korea conflict and the confrontation 
between Russia and Chechen Rebels. In both cases, the analysis yields new strategic insights 
and improved advice.   
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“We praise a man who feels angry on the right ground and 
against the right persons and also in the right manner at the right 
moment and for the right length of time.” Aristotle (384-322 BC).  
 
1.1 Predominance of Emotion in Conflict 
Conflicts, ranging from benign differences of opinion to deadly confrontations, inevitably 
arise whenever human beings interact with one another in the course of managing their daily 
affairs. Disagreements among individuals over daily issues can easily change into hostile 
reactions as a result of the way situations are perceived, and the emotional values that are 
attached. For example, consider a community-based City Council. Often, controversies arise 
over the enforcement of bylaws affecting the socio-economic development and management 
of the city’s resources. These controversies can easily escalate into a serious conflict, which 
creates a climate of enmity between citizens and City Councilors.   
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On the other extreme, instability and violence have brought suffering and humiliation to 
people all over the world, and often led to atrocities.  The immediate consequences of these 
conflicts are, inter alia, fatalities, ethnic cleansing, poverty, hunger, human rights violations, 
and compulsory migrations. Diamond (2005) argues that the collapses of ancient civilizations 
such as the Maya in Central America, Great Zimbabwe in Africa, and Easter Island in the 
Pacific Ocean were mainly caused by failure to respond effectively to problems, and in 
particular by systematically making decisions that hindered survival. Hence, societal 
collapses were brought about by failures in group decision making mechanisms. 
Nowadays, resource-driven conflicts predominate worldwide, in terms of both numbers 
and severity. During the 1990s, more than 5 million people were killed, 5 to 6 million were 
forced to flee to neighboring countries, and 11 to 15 million people were displaced inside 
borders of their home countries as a result of these conflicts (Renner, 2002).  In most cases, a 
common denominator was the precipitated emotion of those involved in conflict. It is no 
wonder that conflict is often described as omnipresent and emotional.  
Emotions play a central role in shaping human lives (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; 
Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1993). They determine how people conceptualize events in relation to 
their environment, and how they react and respond to these events. Emotions affect attention, 
beliefs, and actions, focusing and guiding memory (Clore and Gasper, 2000; Damasio, 1994) 
and influencing our cognitive processes. They shape and strengthen our beliefs (Frijda and 
Mesquita, 2000; Elster, 1999b), help us rearrange our priorities and revise our goal 
hierarchies (Simon 1976), influence our preferences, and act as a nexus among our beliefs, 
value systems, and wants, thereby strengthening our commitments. Finally, emotions tend to 
induce specific actions that restore equilibrium or balance (Elster, 1999a), including coping 
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responses that enable us to manage the emotions themselves (Lazarus, 2001; Lazarus and 
Lazarus, 1994). For example, individuals naturally tend to eliminate the conditions that 
produce negative emotion: an angry person may seek revenge, creating an equilibrium by 
matching harm with harm (Allred, 1999). 
Recent research in behavior, judgment, and decision making has recognized the effects of 
emotions on individuals’ choices. A person’s emotions at the moment of decision and his or 
her assessment of the risk associated with that decision are strongly correlated. Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) posit that emotion often drives behavior in risky situations 
by mediating the cognitive assessment of risk. Lerner and Keltner (2001, 2000) developed an 
appraisal-tendency hypothesis of the effect of emotion on judgment that goes beyond a 
valence-based contrast of positive and negative emotions. Different emotions, they found, 
predispose individuals to assess the environment differently. For example, fear tends to make 
a decision maker pessimistic and risk averse, while anger leads to more optimistic risk 
assessments and risk-acceptant behavior (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, there is an isomorphism between the characteristics 
that define and drive conflict and those that engender emotions. Emotions apply to something 
of relevance or interest to the decision maker, and are triggered by a large variety of stimuli 
within the self-environment relationship (Lazarus, 2001a,b). Specifically, negative emotion 
commences as a response to physical or psychological perception of someone else’s 
blameworthy action as hindering personal goals or needs, especially if the obstruction has a 
long-term effect, seen as transgressing a norm, being unfair, or being illegitimate (Frijda, 
1986, 1988).  Conflict, on the other hand, is driven by the perceived incompatibility of 
something of relevance, and the interference of others on the achievement of one’s goals. It is 
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not surprising that these features also engender negative emotion, which tends to prevail 
during confrontations in a way that further exacerbate decision makers’ perceptions of 
behavioral possibilities and available outcomes. Hence, conflict is often accompanied with 
such negative emotions as anger, fear, and frustration. 
Although emotions shape and influence the way a conflict commences, continues, and is 
resolved, not until recently were emotions considered in the modeling and analysis processes. 
In particular, Howard, Bennett, Bryant, and Bradley (1992) proposed drama theory as a new 
approach that recognizes the importance of emotions in conflict. However, in drama theory 
emotions are the result of dilemmas facing the decision makers at the moment of declaring 
positions. In other words, in drama theory emotions in a conflict model are treated 
superficially (Inohara, 2000). The stance taken in this research is that emotions are inherent 
in conflict; a good conflict model must, therefore, include them.   
Accordingly, the development of formal methodologies to address complex decision 
problems and disputes in a way that takes into account how decision makers conceptualize 
events in relation to their environment and how they react and respond to these events is 
crucial in building realistic models of conflict, and thereby providing better predictions and 
resolutions. That is the aim of this research. 
 
1.2 Classical Approaches to Conflict Analysis 
Since conflict is characteristic of every aspect of human life, research on conflict resolution 
has taken place in a wide variety of disciplines. A rich range of psychological, sociological, 
game theory, systems engineering and other models has been developed for studying conflict 
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(Hipel, 2002; Hipel and Obeidi, 2005). (For an overview of models investigating conflict and 
its resolution, refer to Conflict Resolution theme in the Encyclopedia of Life Support 
Systems (EOLSS).) In particular, many formal techniques that have been developed to 
analyze decision situations characterized by conflict of interest are founded upon various 
assumptions. Game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953) furnished an early set of 
mathematical tools to conceptualize conflict as a decision problem (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
It stresses the structural similarities between an interactive decision problem and a conflict: 
there are two or more players, each with some ability to choose between alternatives or 
courses of action; each available alternative is fully known to each player; each player has 
preferences over outcomes (usually expressed using Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities); 
and each player makes choices conducive to his or her own goals, and expects the opponent 
to do likewise.  
Other formal tools proposed to model and analyze interactive decision problems include 
Metagame Theory (Howard, 1971), Conflict Analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), Hypergame 
Analysis (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Wang, Hipel, and Fraser, 1988), the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution (Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993), and Drama Theory (Bennett and 
Howard, 1996; Bryant, 2003; Howard, 1999; Howard, Bennett, Bryant, and Bradley, 1992). 
These methodologies are related to game theory, but differ in modeling assumptions or 
analysis principles. But they all share the game theory view of the meaning of conflict.  
All of these conflict analysis techniques apply to conflict conceived as a multi-person, 
multi-objective decision problem. For example, disputes over environmental pollution or 
shared utilization and ownership of resources are decision situations involving stakeholders 
who can influence outcomes. For example, Obeidi, Hipel, and Kilgour (2006) applied the 
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Graph Model for Conflict Resolution on a dispute among the government of Canada, the 
Mi’kmaq First Nation, and commercial fishermen over lobster fishing rights in New 
Brunswick, Canada.   
A new paradigm for describing conflict has emerged: the concept of strategic conflict 
model refers to a model of a real conflict that captures all relevant components as structural 
characteristics. Thus, a strategic conflict model describes the decision makers, their 
opportunities, and their objectives and values as represented through their preferences over 
outcomes. Game theory and other conflict analysis techniques focus on finding outcomes that 
are stable with respect to choices made in decision makers’ interests. In this optimality sense, 
the approach incorporates rationality. 
The limitations of mathematical models, which by necessity are formal, systematic, and 
abstract, are acknowledged by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 3): “Game theory does not, and 
probably no mathematical theory could, encompass all the diverse problems which are 
included in our brief characterization of conflict of interest.” More recently, Raiffa (2002, p. 
xii) stated: “… for a long time I found the assumptions made in standard game theory too 
restrictive for it to have wide applicability.” Game theory and related conflict analysis 
techniques incorporate models that emphasize the instrumental nature of conflicts, i.e., their 
structural features. While this reduction has proven useful and practical, these conflict 
models cannot account for the interpersonal and relational dynamics, or the turbulence 
engendered by these dynamics. Specifically, the concept of strategic conflict lacks an 
essential ingredient present in most conflicts of interest: emotion.  
In addition, game-theoretic and related methods focus on strategic choice as a tool to an 
end, and therefore concentrate on substantive issues that are openly declared by the parties, to 
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the exclusion of salient interpersonal issues. Emotions and their effects on the evolution of a 
situation are often ignored in attempts to resolve complex disputes and social problems, on 
the grounds that emotional build-ups are outside the purview of cognitive assessment. Simple 
disagreements or debates over mundane issues can be transformed into open hostility because 
of perceptions and emotional values attached to the issues by stakeholders. Hence, unless the 
effects of emotions are understood and incorporated into theories of decision making and 
conflict analysis techniques, it is impossible to fully understand phenomena such as social 
integration and confrontation.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Among the aforementioned methodologies to model and analyze interactive decision 
problems, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is probably the simplest and most 
flexible, and therefore most capable of carrying out realistic strategic studies of actual 
conflict. Within the structure of a Graph Model, the basic ingredient for analysis is a state, 
which corresponds to a distinguishable outcome or scenario of the conflict. An important step 
in modeling a conflict is identifying the states. The set of feasible states is then used to 
represent the vertices in each decision maker’s (DM’s) directed graph. Other components of 
the Graph Model are state transitions and DMs’ preferences with respect to the states. 
Subsequently, DMs’ interactions are modeled as evolving from an initial state, or a status 
quo, through state transitions controlled by DMs until some final state is reached, which 
represents a resolution of the conflict. The stability of a state is assessed from a DM’s 
viewpoint by examining potential moves and countermoves by other DMs to an initial move 
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by the DM. In a standard graph model, a state that is stable for all DMs constitutes an 
equilibrium, which is equivalent to a potential resolution.    
To capture a range of styles of decision making under conflict, various stability 
definitions (solution concepts) are used to assess the stability of a state for a given DM. A 
solution concept is a mathematical model, which consists of a set of rules for identifying a 
state at which a DM would stay, given that the state has been attained. The following solution 
concepts have been adapted to the paradigm of the Graph Model: Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 
1951), general metarationality (Howard, 1971), symmetric metarationality (Howard, 1971), 
sequential stability (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), limited-move stability (Fang, Hipel, and 
Kilgour, 1993; Kilgour, 1985; Zagare, 1984), and non-myopic stability (Brams and Wittman, 
1981).  
The decision support system GMCR II (Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, and Peng, 1997; Fang, 
Hipel, Kilgour, and Peng, 2003a,b) allows the Graph Model methodology to be applied 
easily to real world disputes. GMCR II models a conflict using the option form of the Graph 
Model methodology, in which a state is a feasible combination of options (or courses of 
action). In a graph model in option form, feasible states are obtained by eliminating 
combinations of options that are logically invalid or otherwise infeasible. For example, if 
options are mutually exclusive, then any combination of them is considered infeasible; such a 
combination cannot be a state of a graph model.  
A major objective of this research is to develop mathematical structures and definitions 
for conflict modeling and analysis that accurately and rigorously include emotions within the 
paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. These new theoretical will advances 
expand the modeling and analysis algorithms by accounting for the consequences of 
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emotions and perceptions on the actions that are perceived to be available, as well as actual 
choices. 
 A key postulate in this research is that central to any conflict are affective reactions, 
which occur when opponents endeavor to manage, control, and cope with the situation. 
Drawing upon different fields of study, conflict is viewed as a process triggered by an event 
or stimulus and evolving through different stages. Both emotion and reasoning are equally 
important in this process: emotion influences the conceptualization of the conflict in early 
stages, while reasoning dominates later stages. Hence, the process of conflict is characterized 
by a combination of perceived incompatible goals/needs (the perceptions of incompatibility) 
and interrelatedness in the accomplishments of these goals or needs (obstructions). Many 
psychology and neuroscience theories of emotion, particularly appraisal theory for emotion 
activation, argue that the characteristics of conflict intrinsically activate negative emotions 
(Lazarus, 2001a,b).    
A DM’s interaction and accompanying emotions affect how he or she explores and 
perceives the ambient realities of conflict, and the changes in it. Hence, a realistic model of a 
complex dispute must take into account reasoning and affective responses. In building a 
standard graph model, the feasible states are identified using a reasoning process. An analyst 
usually contemplates which states may actually occur in the conflict. Likewise, identifying 
the feasible states in a graph model in option form depends upon determining those 
combinations of options that are logically valid, while eliminating from the model those that 
are infeasible. To account for the role of emotion in affecting DMs’ perceptions of outcomes, 
a new principle is introduced, based on studies of the inextricable relationship between 
cognitive and emotional processes. The possibility principle focuses attentions on feasible 
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states that are not perceived by a DM either due to the presence of negative emotions or the 
lack of positive emotions. Hence, the possibility principle is a refinement to the method of 
identifying states that are recognized by a DM. It is expected that this refinement will 
simplify the modeling stage in the Graph Model. This line of research constitutes one major 
component of this thesis.  
Within the framework of the standard Graph Model, it is assumed that all DMs share the 
same view of the conflict. Hence, all DMs’ directed graphs have the same vertices, or states, 
which are often combined to form an integrated graph. But, the emotions that shape the 
DMs’ apprehensions of states produce inconsistencies in perception across the DMs, making 
it impossible to integrate the individual graphs, as is commonly done in the standard graph 
model. Hence, each DM must have a private graph which for him or her represents the only 
model for the conflict. To accommodate this inconsistency in perceptions, each DM’s graph 
is treated as a perceptual graph model. Moreover, the DM’s awareness (or not) of other DMs’ 
perceptions must be accounted for in the model. Under this conceptual framework, graph 
model systems are used to represent a conflict realistically. A graph model system consists of 
a list of all DMs’ perceptual graph models, and includes specification of the viewpoint of 
each DM, i.e., whether or not he or she is aware that other DMs perceive the conflict 
differently.  The pattern of inconsistencies of perception is called the variant of awareness.  
Another major contribution of this research, therefore, is the formal definition of a perceptual 
graph model and a graph model system, which allow the DMs to have different views of the 
conflict. 
Perceptual stability analysis is developed to analyze a graph model system and to draw 
meaningful conclusions about: 1) states that are qualified to be resolutions for the conflict, 
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and, 2) the sustainability of those resolutions across different combinations of awareness. 
Perceptual stability analysis consists of a two-phase approach for analyzing perceptual graph 
models, and employs meta-stability analysis to consolidate the findings of stability analysis 
in individual graphs. New stability and equilibrium definitions are introduced to 
accommodate the stability analysis procedure developed. In particular, perceptual solution 
concepts for the two-decision maker case are developed in detail. Perceptual stability 
analysis represents another major contribution of this research.    
     
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
The main objective of this research is to broaden the Graph Model methodology into a new 
territory that takes into account the effects of emotion upon decision making under conflict. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this line of research is completely original. Moreover, 
the theoretical advances in this research significantly enhance the applicability of the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution to real-world disputes.    
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and the various solution concepts that are used within 
it. In Chapter 3, a general definition for emotion is given. The neurobiological structures in 
the brain that are responsible for the activation of emotions and their homeostatic responses, 
as well as Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis, are also discussed. Chapter 4 outlines the 
essential features of conflict, and juxtaposes them with Lazarus’ appraisals that activate 
emotion. The main objective of this chapter is to support the postulate that emotion is an 
essential ingredient in conflict analysis. In Chapter 5, Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis 
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is operationalized using the possibility principle by expanding the set of feasible states to 
include hidden and potential states. The US-North Korea conflict is used to illustrate this 
concept in a real-world case. Chapter 6 concentrates on formally defining a perceptual graph 
model and a graph model system and on designing algorithms to carry out stability analyses 
of this system. The standard solution concepts, which are introduced in Chapter 2, are 
extended to accommodate inconsistent perceptions. This is done with perceptual stability 
analysis, which takes into account each DM’s awareness of the states in his or her perceived 
graph model that are not recognized by opponents. Subsequent to these theoretical 
developments, a real-world dispute is presented to illustrate how perceptual stability analysis 
is practically applied in analyzing a graph model system. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the 













By its nature, a model is an abstraction—a simplified yet well-defined representation, 
intended to capture key characteristics and relationships that are important to the issues at 
hand (Obeidi, Hipel, and Kilgour, 2006). Representation and simplification are often difficult 
to achieve simultaneously. Nonetheless, even the most abstract models can effectively 
describe the key components of a state of affairs, and provide concrete insights into behavior.  
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993) is a 
methodological approach for framing an interactive decision situation, or conflict, in a format 
to which stability analysis can be applied. It serves as a prospective or retrospective strategic 
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assessment tool for disputes; it also serves as a simulation tool for DMs’ interactions and 
behavior, and can be used in negotiation preparation and mediation.  
The Graph Model, which originated in conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) and 
ultimately in metagame theory (Howard, 1971), employs definitions phrased in terminology 
from graph theory, set theory, and logic to model and analyze a conflict. Within its structure, 
the basic lens for analysis is the state, which permits the representation of a DM’s available 
actions as the state-to-state transitions it controls. Each DM’s possible moves from state to 
state are depicted using a directed graph in which nodes represent states and arcs indicate 
state transitions controlled by the DM. The model is considered to always be in some state; 
changes of states are controlled by the DMs. Thus, a state is a potential outcome, or scenario, 
of the conflict. Usually, a Graph Model specifies an initial state, or status quo.  
The systematic procedure for applying the Graph Model follows the two main stages 
shown in Figure 2.1. In the modeling stage, the problem is structured by determining the key 
ingredients: the DMs, the states, the possible state transitions controlled by each DM, and 
each DM’s relative preferences over the states. Next, in the analysis stage, the stability of 
each state from each DM’s viewpoint is determined. The DMs’ interactions are conceived as 
directing the evolution of the conflict from a status quo state via state transitions until some 




Figure 2.1: Applying the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. 
 
Uncertainty in DMs’ preferences and sudden or unforeseen events that affect the robustness 
of stability analyses and the dynamics of the conflict are uncovered using sensitivity analysis. 
Like any model, the Graph Model is an abstract representation of key elements of a conflict. 
One can rarely be sure of the accuracy and completeness of the information used to calibrate 
a conflict model. Sensitivity analyses focus on the implications of changes in model 
parameters, by asking what-if questions, or studying how the preferences of a DM would 
have to be changed to produce more preferable equilibria for another DM. A reasonable 
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range of possible preferences can be analyzed to ascertain how equilibria are affected. If the 
equilibria do not change as preferences are modified, one can have greater confidence in the 
results of the analysis. Alternatively, when the equilibria change drastically with small 
preference changes, then the analyst must ensure that the model is as accurate and reliable as 
possible. 
 
2.2 Ingredients and Definitions of a Graph Model 
The modeling stage in Figure 2.1 can be described using the flow diagram shown in Figure 
2.2.  It is often convenient to develop a graph model using the option form (Howard, 1971); 
this method, for example, is used in the decision support system GMCR II (Hipel, Kilgour, 
Fang, and Peng, 1997; Fang, Hipel, Kilgour, and Peng, 2003a,b).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Flow diagram of the modeling stage in the Graph Model. 
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The essential ingredients of a Graph Model in option form are the DMs and the options (or 
courses of action) available to each DM. In general, a DM may exercise any combination of 
the options he or she controls, thereby creating a strategy. When every DM has selected a 
strategy, a state is defined. Of course, there may be restrictions on the option choices or 
changes of options available to a DM. When these are specified, the feasible states, which 
constitute the actual set of states in the model, are determined.   
Often there are substantive, logical reasons why a particular combination of options does 
not represent a feasible state. If so, the combination is removed by specifying how options 
are contingent, co-requisite, obligatory, or mutually exclusive. An option is contingent if its 
availability depends on the selection of another option. For example, option A is contingent 
on option B when option A can be selected only if option B is selected. Contingent options 
are said to be co-requisite when they must be taken, or not, together; thus, option B is co-
requisite for option A if A is taken when B is taken, and A is not taken when B is not taken. 
Options are obligatory if at least one of them must be taken, and mutually exclusive if at 
most one of them can be taken (Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, and Peng, 1997). Mutually exclusive 
options can be described simply as incompatible; for instance, either option A or option B 
can be chosen, possibly neither, but not both. A feasible state is a combination of options that 
does not violate any constraint: combinations that violate constraints are called “infeasible.” 
State transitions are determined in Step 3 of Figure 2.2. The state-to-state transitions 
controlled by a DM are exactly those implied by a unilateral change of the DM’s option 
selection. These steps produce the usual set of directed graphs, and the graph model is 
completed in Step 4 by each DM’s relative preferences among feasible states. Since each 
 
  18
DM’s graph has the same set of nodes, it is often useful to show all DMs’ graphs on the same 
diagram by simply integrating them and labeling each arc to indicate the DM who controls it.  
Such a graph is called the integrated graph of the model. A graphical representation of the 
information garnered in the modeling stage gives a convenient and clear structure for 
envisioning outcomes, any choice or transition restrictions, and possible moves and 
countermoves by the DMs. Often, strategic insights are gained from studying the graph, even 
before any stability analyses are carried out.  
Formally, let N denote the set of all DMs, where 1 .N< < ∞  The set of states is ,S  
where 2 .S≤ < ∞  A graph model for a conflict consists of a collection of directed graphs. 
Each DM is said to have a directed graph in which the nodes are the states and the arcs are 
the state-to-state transitions controlled by the DM. For each ,i N∈  DM i’s directed graph is 
written as ( , ),iS A  where DM i’s arcs are .iA S S⊂ ×  Another component of a Graph Model 
is each DM’s relative preferences among states, which are usually expressed by pairwise 
comparisons of states, whereby a DM prefers one state more than another or is indifferent 
between them. Hence, for each ,i N∈  DM i’s preferences over S  are usually expressed by 
the binary relations { , },i i∼  where ia b  means that DM i strictly prefers a  to b  and 
ia b∼ means that DM i is indifferent between a  and .b  The Graph Model can handle both 
transitive and intransitive preferences. However, in most real life conflicts DMs’ preferences 
can be assumed to be transitive, and thus expressed as a ranking (ordering) of the states from 
most to least preferred, where ties are allowed. (More discussion about the properties of these 
binary relationships is given later in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.)  
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Based on DM i’s preferences over states, S can be partitioned into two sets, relative to a 
particular or focal state ,s S∈  as follows: ( ) { : }i m m is s S s s
+Φ = ∈  is the set of all states 
that DM i prefers to state ;s  and ( ) { : }ii m ms s S s s
≤Φ = ∈  is the set of all states that DM i 
finds equally or less preferred to state .s  In the Graph Model, the set of all states that DM i 
can unilaterally reach from state s S∈ in one step is the reachable list ( ).iR s  Hence, the 
concept of unilateral improvement is based on a DM’s preferences and his or her reachable 
list. A unilateral improvement (UI) from a particular state for a specific DM is a preferred 
state (for that DM) to which he or she can unilaterally move in one step. It follows that 
( )iR s  can be partitioned into two subsets: ( ) ( ) ( )i i iR s R s s
+ += Φ∩  is the set of unilateral 
improvements from state s  for DM i; and ( ) ( ) ( )i i iR s R s s
≤ ≤= Φ∩  is the set of unilateral 
disimprovements from state s  for DM i. 
 
2.3 Stability Analysis 
The stability of states for DMs is defined by various solution concepts, or stability 
definitions, which are mathematical descriptions of patterns of reasoning that formally model 
social behavior capturing a wide range of decision styles in conflict situations. Table 2.1 lists 
the solution concepts that are commonly used for assessing stability of states and equilibria, 
along with a qualitative description of how each solution concept is designed to reflect 
human behavior under conflict. These solution concepts encompass diverse decision styles 
and behavioral patterns from cautious and conservative to strategic and proactive and from 
naïve to sophisticated.  
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Table 2.1: Solution Concepts in the Graph Model and their Behavioral 
Interpretations 
Characteristics Solution 
Concepts Stability Descriptions Foresight Disimprovement Knowledge of Preferences 
Strategic 
Risk 
Nash Stability  A focal DM cannot unilaterally 
move to a more preferred state. 
Low Never Own Ignores risk. 
General 
Metrationality  
All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned by 
subsequent unilateral moves by 
others. 




All focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are still sanctioned 
even after possible responses by the 
focal DM. 




All of the focal DM’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned by 
subsequent unilateral improvements 
by others. 





All DMs are assumed to act 
optimally and a maximum number of 
state transitions (h) is specified. 




Limiting case of limited move 
stability as the maximum number of 
state transitions increases to infinity. 
High Strategic All Accepts risk; 
strategizes. 
  
The characteristic called foresight refers to the DM’s ability to consider possible future 
moves. Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951) reflects a DM who thinks only one step ahead. In 
general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971) and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984), a DM considers exactly two steps ahead; whereas in symmetric metarationality 
(SMR) (Howard, 1971), the DM contemplates three steps by assessing available escapes 
from any sanctions that may be imposed by the opponents. Limited-move stability (Fang, 
Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993; Kilgour, 1985; Zagare, 1984) allows a DM a foresight of horizon h 
moves distant (referred to as Lh stability); whereas in non-myopic stability (Brams and 
Wittman, 1981) foresight is unlimited.  
Disimprovement refers to the tendency of a DM to move to a less preferred state in order 
to reach a more preferred state eventually, or to block unilateral improvements of other DMs. 
In limited-move and non-myopic stability, a DM may accept a strategic disimprovement. But 
in Nash and sequential stability, disimprovements are never permitted, while in general and 
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symmetric metarationality only disimprovements by the opponents for the purpose of 
sanctioning are allowed.  
The knowledge of preferences refers to the amount of information available to a DM 
about its own and the others’ relative preferences over states. Under Nash, GMR, and SMR 
stability, opponents’ preferences are not needed. But under SEQ, limited-move, and non-
myopic stability, knowledge of opponents’ relative preferences among states is required. 
The characteristic called strategic risk refers to the attitude of a DM to risk. Nash stability 
refers to a myopic DM who ignores risk. In GMR and SMR stability, the DM is conservative 
and exhibits a risk-averse decision attitude, while in SEQ, limited-move, and non-myopic 
stability, the DM gradually accepts some risk.    
Since different solution concepts may be appropriate for different DMs, states that are 
stable under many solution concepts are usually preferred. Thus, it is important to consider 
more than one kind of solution concept for each DM to ensure a robust prediction of the 
evolution and resolution of the conflict. 
However, in limited-move and non-myopic solution concepts, DMs’ preferences must be 
transitive. Behavioral game theorists have challenged recently the notion of unlimited 
strategizing, arguing that in an interactive decision situation DMs are often capable of 
thinking only a limited numbers of  steps ahead (Camerer, 2003; Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and 
Rymon, 2002; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001). Following this view, limited-
move and non-myopic stabilities may not provide as many practical insights as the other 
solution concepts, and will not be emphasized in this thesis.  
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2.4 Formal Definitions of Standard Solution Concepts 
A state is considered to be stable for a DM if and only if (iff) that DM is not tempted to move 
away from it unilaterally. A state is an equilibrium, or a possible resolution under a particular 
solution concept, if all DMs find it to be stable under that solution concept. In the following, 
Nash stability, general and symmetric metarationality, and sequential stability are defined for 
two-decision maker conflicts modeled in graph form. For simplicity, let {1,2}N =  and either 
1i =  and 2j =  or 2i =  and 1j = . Furthermore, assume that DM i seizes the initiative and 
moves first. Hence, i  is called the focal DM and DM j is i’s opponent.    
 
Definition 2.1: Nash stability 
For ,i N∈  a state s S∈  is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by  Nash ,is S∈  iff ( ) .iR s
+ = ∅  
 
Under the Nash solution concept, a DM will move to a more preferred state whenever 
possible, without regard to any possible countermoves by the opponent. Hence, a state s  is 
Nash stable for DM i iff i has no unilateral improvements from .s   
 
Definition 2.2: General metarationality (GMR) 
For ,i N∈  a state s S∈  is general metarational stable for DM i, denoted by GMR ,is S∈  iff 
for every ( )it R s
+∈  there exists ( ) ( ) .j iR t s
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩   
 
Thus, a state s  is general metarational stable for DM i  iff for every UI i can take advantage 
of, the opponent, DM j, can subsequently move to a state that is at most as good for i as the 
original state .s  In other words, DM j can sanction each of i’s UIs by moving to a state that 
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is less than or equally preferred to state s  by DM i. Therefore, a DM who follows general 
metarationality selects his or her unilateral moves in light of the opponent’s possible 
reactions, irrespective of the opponent’s preferences.   
 
Definition 2.3: Sequential stability (SEQ) 
For ,i N∈  a state s S∈  is sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by SEQ ,is S∈  iff for every 
( )it R s
+∈  there exists ( ) ( ) .j iR t s
+ ≤Φ ≠ ∅∩   
 
A state s  is sequentially stable for DM i  iff  every UI for i  from s  is credibly sanctioned  
by the sanctioner DM j. A credible sanction is a sanction that directly benefits the sanctioner, 
i.e., is also a UI for the sanctioner. A DM who follows sequential stability takes into 
consideration not only his or her possible moves, but also the opponent’s unilateral 
improvements.  
 
Definition 2.4: Symmetric metarationality (SMR) 
For ,i N∈  a state s S∈ is symmetric metarational stable for DM i, denoted by SMR ,is S∈  iff 
for every ( )it R s
+∈ , ( ) ( ) ,j iR t s
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩  and for all ( ) ( ),j ih R t s
≤∈ Φ∩  ( ) ( ) .i iR h s
+Φ =∅∩  
 
A state s  is symmetric metarational stable for DM i iff not only every UI for i from s  is 
sanctioned by the opponent, but no unilateral counter-response by DM i can leave it better off 
than the original state .s  In other words, there is an inescapable sanction to every possible UI 
by DM i.  
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The flow chart diagram in Figure 2.2 depicts the determination of whether a state s  is 
Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stable from the point of view of DM i for the general case of n  
decision makers. State s  is Nash stable for DM i  if  i cannot move away from s to any state 
i prefers. Such a move would be called a unilateral improvement (UI) for DM i from state .s  
The (myopic) underlying assumption of Nash stability is that DM i expects that the other 
DMs, ,N i−  would not move away from the state reached after i’s move. A state s  is 
GMR stable for DM i  iff for every UI available to i there is at least one state t  that DMs 
N i−  can reach through a combination of subsequent moves, such that state t is at most 
equally preferred to state s  for DM i. Thus, under GMR stability, DM i assumes other DMs 
will respond to i’s move by sanctioning i, i.e. by hurting i if it is possible for them to do so, 
regardless of their own preferences. The SEQ solution concept is similar to GMR except that 
the sanction by DMs N i−   must be credible, i.e. it must consist only of unilateral moves 
that are UIs for the DMs who make them. If s  is GMR stable for DM i, and DM i is 
incapable of counterresponding to every sanction of each UI available to i, then state s  is 
also SMR stable for DM i. Note that under Nash the DM contemplates one move ahead, 
under GMR and SEQ two moves (or more if required to sanction), and under SMR three 
moves (again, more if the sanction requires it). 
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Is there a UI 
     for DM i from s?
Can DM i  move away
 from s unilaterally?
Yes
s is stable by 
default No













Is there a UI for
DM i  from s that 
is not sanctioned? No
Is there a UI for DM i




Is there a UI for 
DM i  from s such that 




s is Nash, GMR, 
SMR and SEQ 
s is not SMR
s is not SEQ
Legend
GMR: general metarationality 
SMR: symmetric metarationality 
SEQ: sequential stability 
UI: unilateral improvement 
DM: decision maker 
 




This chapter provides an overview of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. The 
systematic procedures for applying the Graph Model, including the option form platform that 
is used in the decision support system GMCR II, are explained. Definitions of the solution 
concepts used in the Graph Model to capture various decision styles, and their characteristics, 
are furnished. Finally, a flow chart diagram illustrates how stability analysis is applied for the 
Graph Model solution concepts Nash, GMR, SEQ, and SMR. In the next chapter, some 
definitions of emotion are given, and then succinct descriptions are provided of: (1) brain 
structures involved in processing and activating emotions, and (2) Damasio’s somatic marker 






3.1 Definitions of Emotion  
Today, there is no commensurable definition for emotion that is acceptable to all scholars 
across different fields of study (Plutchik, 1980, 2002). Traditionally, emotions were 
considered “bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact” (James, 1884, 
p. 204), “hereditary pattern-reaction involving changes of the bodily mechanisms as a 
whole” (Watson, 1924, p. 22), or biological functions necessary for survival (Maclean, 
1963).  
Nowadays, some scholars view emotions as psychological response patterns and 
subjective experiences (Lazarus, 1991), “tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt 
relationship with the environment” (Frijda, 1986, p. 71), “valenced reactions to events” 
(Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988, p. 25), or “experiential representation of a nonsymbolic 
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information-processing system” (Jones, 1995, p. 201). Naturally, researchers across different 
fields of study propose a variety of definitions in which some emphasize certain aspects of 
emotion, such as its nature, characteristics, and functionality, and some focus on what causes 
the phenomenon and how it is expressed.  
Many social scientists, for example, advocate a constructionist view of emotion, in which 
they contend that although some basic (or primary) emotions such as fear, anger, happiness, 
sadness, and disgust are biologically hardwired in the brain, complex emotions, which are 
vital to social integration, are learned and frequently adapted under the influence of norms, 
values, and beliefs of a specific culture (Averill, 1980; Cornelius, 1996; Turner and Sets, 
2005). According to Averill (1980, p. 309), “Emotions are not just remnants of our 
phylogenetic past, nor can they be explained in strictly physiological terms. Rather, they are 
social constructions, and they can be fully understood only on a social level of analysis.” 
On the other hand, affective neuroscientists such as LeDoux, Damasio, and Panksepp 
focus on the adaptive, integrative functions of emotion that underlie vital cognitive processes 
such as memory, perception, and attention (Adolphs, 2003a; Dolan, 2002). Adolphs (2003a), 
Damasio (1994), Frijda, Mansted, and Bem (2000), LeDoux (1986, 1996), and Scherer 
(2001), among others, view emotion as mental states of arousal that arises in reaction to 
exteroceptive (body’s exterior) or interoceptive (body’s interior) sensory stimuli. An arousal 
state represents varied patterns of ongoing activities and processes in all brain areas, which 
produces different internal and external responses, and intends to regulate life processes and 
promote survival (Damasio, 2003). These responses, for instance, can be autonomic (e.g., a 
change in heart rate, rapid breathing, blood pressure), endocrine (hormone releases), 
behavioral, motivational, and expressive (e.g., facial expressions, body posture) changes, 
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which are functions of emotion in reaction to a stimulus of concern (Rolls, 1999). Panksepp 
(1998, p. 48) views emotions as “the psychoneural processes that are especially influential in 
controlling the vigor and patterning of actions in the dynamic flow of intense behavioral 
interchanges between animals, as well as with certain objects during circumstances that are 
especially important for survival.”  
Experimental psychologists focus on the subjective or experiential aspects of emotion 
that emphasize excitement/depression or pleasure/displeasure. Rolls (2000, p. 178), for 
example, defines emotions as “states elicited by rewards and punishments, including changes 
in rewards and punishments.”  
Some scholars attribute the challenge in defining emotion to the complexity of the states 
and processes associated with it. Young (1973, p. 749), for instance, argues that “almost 
everyone except the psychologist knows what an emotion is….The trouble with the 
psychologist is that emotional processes and states are complex and can be analyzed from so 
many points of view that a complete picture is virtually impossible.” Kleinginna and 
Kleinginna (1981, p. 355) conclude that a definition of emotion should be “broad enough to 
include all traditionally significant aspects of emotions, while attempting to differentiate it 
[emotion] from other psychological processes.” They compiled, analyzed, and classified a list 
of ninety two definitions of emotion, which they gathered from a variety of literature on the 
subject, and proposed the following definition: “Emotion is a complex set of interactions 
among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) 
give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) 
generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, 
labeling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing 
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conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal-directed, 
and adaptive” (Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981, p. 355).    
 
3.2 The Neurobiological Underpinnings of Emotion  
For decades, philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have been studying the nature 
of emotion. The earliest views were those of the Ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato 
(427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC). Aristotle, for example, recognized the importance 
of using emotion in reasoning and persuasion. In Rhetoric, Aristotle reflected that emotion 
requires three prerequisites to be activated: proper state of mind, stimulus, and context 
(Power and Dalgleish, 1997). In the 19th century, the exceptional naturalist Charles Darwin 
(1809-1892) suggested that emotion is an evolutionary phenomenon that has a very important 
survival function in all animals (Darwin, 1873). Well-known Darwinians, such as William 
McDougall, Robert Plutchik, Paul Ekman, Carroll Izard, and Sylvan Tompkins, are still 
focusing their research on the universal (i.e., basic) emotions: what causes them and how 
they are expressed. Shortly after Darwin came up with his opinion about emotion, William 
James (1842-1910), a psychologist and philosopher, insisted that the common view to think 
about how emotion is felt is not correct. James (1884) suggested the first theory of emotion 
activation, in which he contended that bodily changes (e.g., increased heart rate and muscles 
tension) directly follow the perception of an event, and that the feeling of these bodily 
changes is the emotion. At the time, a physician and psychologist, Carl Lang (1834-1900), 
supported James’ view. However, the James-Lang theory of emotion was refuted by a 
student of James, Walter Cannon (1871-1945). Cannon, a physiologist, raised questions 
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about the James-Lang theory, and argued that it was flawed (Cannon, 1945). Ironically, some 
modern neuroscientists partially agree with the James-Lang theory (Damasio, 2003; Dolan, 
2002).  
 Afterward, the dynamic relationships between cognitive and emotional processes have 
been the focus of many psychologists and neuroscientists. Stanley Schachter’s two-factor 
theory, which described, for the first time, the presence of a cognitive component in the 
process of experiencing emotion, was eventually replaced by an appraisal theory (explained 
in Section 3.2.2 from a neurological point of view, and also described in Chapter 4, Section 
4.2), of which many scholars in the field (e.g., Magda Arnold, Richard Lazarus, Nico Frijda, 
Ira Roseman) fully support. 
Advances in neuroimaging technologies, especially functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (or fMRI), have facilitated the study of the neurobiological substrates of emotion 
(Adolphs, 2003a; Dolan, 2002). Researchers now have a better understanding of the central 
role of emotion (mediation, regulation, or coordination) in memory, learning, and attention 
(Adolphs, 2003a,b; Dolan, 2002); and of the association between cognitive and emotional 
processes in various brain regions (Houser, Bechara, Keane, McCabe, and Smith, 2005; 
Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, and Damasio, 1994). Some study the neural 
underpinnings of emotion (e.g., Joseph LeDoux), and others investigate the structural 
underpinnings of emotion (e.g., Antonio Damasio and Antoine Bechara). The following is a 
brief description of brain structures that are mainly responsible for processing and activating 
emotion. (Much of the information in the following section is drawn heavily from Noback, 
Strominger, Demarest, and Ruggiero (2005) and Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun (2002).)  
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3.2.1 The Central Nervous System 
The nervous system is composed of the central nervous system, which includes the brain and 
the spinal cord, and the peripheral nervous system. The peripheral nervous system consists of 
the somatic system, where electrochemical impulses travel between the brain and the muscles 
via nerve fibers, and the autonomic nervous system, which consists of nerve fibers that carry 
electrochemical impulses between the brain and the viscera (singular is viscus)—the internal 
organs, especially those contained in the abdominal and thoracic cavities. The autonomic 





Figure 3.1: The cerebral cortex (left) and the limbic system (right). 
 
In the left diagram of Figure 3.1, the cerebral cortex (or brain) is mapped out in terms of five 
main lobes, in which each is symmetrically located in the cerebral hemispheres. The 
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temporal lobe is located on the side, beneath and behind the ear, and is involved in the 
sensing of smell and sound, as well as processing of complex stimuli like faces and scenes. 
The occipital lobe is located at the far back of the brain, and mainly connected to the eyes. 
The parietal lobe is located above the temporal lobe and in front of the occipital lobe, and 
plays important roles in integrating sensory information from various senses, and in the 
manipulation of objects; portions of the parietal lobe are involved with visuo-spatial 
processing. The frontal lobe is located at the front of each cerebral hemisphere, where the 
temporal lobes are located beneath and behind the frontal lobes. The frontal lobes are 
involved in motor function, problem solving, spontaneity, memory, language, initiation, 
judgment, impulse control, and social and sexual behavior (Adolphs 2003a; Wood and 
Grafman, 2003). 
The anterior part of the frontal lobe is the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is a hub for a 
high number of interconnections with other brain regions, especially deeper structures such 
as the limbic system. The prefrontal lobe can be divided into ventromedial, dorsolateral, and 
orbitofrontal regions. According to Wood and Grafman (2003), the ventromedial PFC is 
closely associated with brain structures responsible for processing emotion (e.g., amygdala), 
memory (i.e., hippocampus), higher-order sensory processing, and relaying information to 
the dorsolateal PFC. Lesions to the ventromedial PFC impair the ability to experience 
emotion and comprehend meaning of things (Damasio, 1994; Wood and Grafman, 2003). On 
the other hand, the dorsolateral PFC is associated with brain structures responsible for motor 
control (e.g., basal ganglia, premotor cortex), performance monitoring (e.g., cingulated 
cortex), and higher-order sensory processing. Therefore, the dorsolateral PFC supports 
regulation of behavior, control responses, and the representation of cognitive actions (Wood 
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and Grafman, 2003). The orbitofrontal cortex has been associated with social reasoning, 
social and moral judgment (i.e., right or wrong choices), and long terms strategic gains 
(Adolphs, 2003a).  
Different regions in the brain are responsible for the evaluation of stimuli that are of 
concern (i.e., emotion-inducing stimuli) and in the experience and expression of emotion 
(Cornelius, 1996). The most important areas are the limbic system and various areas in the 
cerebral cortex. As shown in Figure 3.1 (right), the limbic system is a complex 
interconnection of neural structures bordering the thalamus, and includes the amygdala, the 
hypothalamus, the hippocampus, the cingulated cortices, and several other nearby areas, 
especially the limbic forebrain (ventromedial PFC). The limbic system appears to be 
primarily responsible for processing emotional states, and has a lot to do with the formation, 
mediation, and regulation of memories (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006). 
The amygdala is the most important neural structure that has been shown to be 
responsible for post-perception processing of information projected from the sensory 
thalamus and higher-order sensory cortices (Adolphs, 2003a,b; Emery and Amaral, 2000; 
LeDoux, 1996, 2000). The amygdaloid complex is an almond-shaped mass of grey matter, 
which is anatomically located in the anterior portion of the temporal lobe and composed of a 




Figure 3.2: Amygdala connection and pathways (Adapted from LeDoux, 2000). 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the sensory thalamus detects exteroceptive stimulus (auditory or 
visual) and projects it to the amygdala; brainstem and insular cortex also project 
interoceptive stimulus (visceral or somatic such as touch, pressure, temperature, and pain) to 
the amygdala. The amygdala, then, assigns affective values (emotions), stores codes for 
subsequent processing of such perceptual information, and projects signals to various 
structures such as the prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus, which is involved in storing 
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and retrieving memory and in the processing of a set of stimuli to create context to a situation 
(Adolphs, 2003b). The amygdala, therefore, influences memory, attention, decision making, 
and other cognitive processes, and activates emotional states to stimuli, which are manifested 
in the form of behavioral, autonomic (heart rate, blood pressure), and endocrine (releases of 
hormones and neurotransmitters) responses. The amygdala can also modulate early 
perception of stimuli via direct feedback to primary and higher-order sensory cortices 
(Adolphs, 2003b). 
Joseph LeDoux, a professor of neuroscience and psychology at New York University 
who focuses on the biological substrates of emotion, especially fear conditioning in rats (i.e., 
Pavlovian conditioning), theorized the presence of a dual-pathway for sensory information 
processing, which is involved in the activation of fear. According to LeDoux (1996, 2000), 
simple sensory information is relayed via the thalamus-amygdala pathway (a subcortical 
pathway), Path 1 in Figure 3.2. This pathway automatically mediates rapid, primary 
emotional responses, which provides initial defense intervention and early warning essential 
for survival. Subsequently, the amygdala begins regulating information projected from the 
higher-order and prefrontal cortices. The regulation can be direct, which is manifested by 
inhibition of stimuli (perceptual defense) and focusing attention on stimuli; or indirect by 
influencing other structures, such as the basal forebrain, which affects the cortical processing 
of stimuli. Complex sensory information is relayed through the thalamus-cortico-amygdala 
pathway, Path 2 in Figure 3.2, in which highly processed information in the neocortex is 
projected to the amygdala. This pathway may either signal to the amygdala to abort the 
defensive reaction or trigger further complex reactions. LeDoux (1996) suggests that 
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information projected from the amygdala back to the higher-order and prefrontal cortices 
may influence and regulate the processing mechanisms in those areas.   
 
3.2.2 Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis  
Antonio Damasio is a physician and neurologist, who along with his colleagues noticed that 
patients with lesions in areas located in the prefrontal cortex maintain normal levels of their 
cognitive capacities (memory, reasoning, speech) and intellects (Bechara and Damasio, 
2005); but the same patients suffer from impairment in their faculties of making risky 
choices, especially in social contexts (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, and Damasio, 
1994). In particular, if the lesion is in the ventromedial PFC, the patients often become 
insensitive to future consequences, and they repeatedly make decisions that are obviously 
contrary to their best interests (Adolphs, 2003; Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio, 2000; Houser, 
Bechara, Keane, McCabe, and Smith, 2005). Furthermore, the patients show compromised 
abilities to express the proper emotions and experience feelings of these emotions (Bechara 
and Damasio, 2005). 
Bechara and Damasio (2005, p. 339) define emotion as “changes in body and brain states 
triggered by a dedicated brain system that responds to specific contents of one’s perceptions, 
actual or recalled, relative to a particular object or event.” The bodily (i.e., somatic) changes 
are a collection of homeostatic processes, which aim at coping and life-regulation to promote 
survival and health (Damsio, 2003). Examples of these homeostatic processes may be the 
release of chemical (e.g., endocrine or hormonal secretions) and movement of mechanical 
(i.e, muscular contractions) components; changes in basic reflexes, immune system, 
behavior, drives, and motivation; and the activation of emotion and feeling.  
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Damasio and his colleagues suggest that emotion is triggered by an appraisal of an 
emotion-inducing stimulus. Appraisal can be primary and spontaneous, which activates basic 
emotions such as fear, anger, and sadness, or secondary and deliberate, which activates 
complex, social emotions such as shame, guilt, envy, and sympathy (Bechara and Damasio, 
2005; Damasio, 1994). Figure 3.3 illustrates the mechanism of primary appraisal for the 
emotion of fear as described by Damasio (2003), where boxes on the left (shadowed) indicate 
the stage of appraisal process and boxes on the right identify brain structures mostly involved 
in processing the stage.     
 
 




An emotion-inducing stimulus, which can be real, perceived, or recalled from memory, 
becomes available in some sensory cortices such as the thalamus or higher-order sensory 
cortices. The sensory cortices process the information and relay it to a number of brain 
structures that trigger emotions (i.e., emotion-triggering structures). As discussed in the 
previous section, the amygdala, cingulated cortex, and ventromedial PFC are some of the 
important sites in the brain that trigger emotional states. Here, it is the amygdala that triggers 
the emotion of fear (LeDoux, 2000). Subsequently, the emotion-triggering structures signal 
other sites (emotion-execution structures) to activate responses (i.e., somatic states) in the 
body proper and the brain, which correspond to the emotion of fear. Some of the emotion-
execution structures are the hypothalamus, the basal forebrain, and some nuclei in brainstem. 
These responses can be in the internal milieu (fluids in the bloodstream and in the spaces 
between cells), in the function of the viscera and the central nervous system, and in the 
musculoskeletal system. 
Damasio (1994, 2003) makes a clear distinction between an emotional state and a feeling 
state. In his view, emotions precede feelings, where the former are innate regulations that are 
essential for survival while the latter are higher-order experiences of these regulations and 
other somatic states. Dolan (2002, p. 1193) defines feelings as “mental representations of 
physiological changes that characterize and are consequent upon processing emotion-
eliciting objects or states.” Bechara and Damasio (2005) and Damasio (1994, 2003) view 
feelings as conscious and adaptive mental representations (i.e., neural mappings) in the form 
of perceptions of certain bodily responses, thoughts, experiences, or acquired knowledge, 
which arise from emotions and any homeostatic reactions. For instances, feelings of pleasure 
and sorrow are experiences of the emotions of joy and sadness, respectively, whereas feeling 
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of appetite is the experience of distinctive somatic states: drive and motivation. According to 
Damasio (2003) and Dolan (2002), among others, the feelings of emotion become active 
when internal somatic sensory signals are projected from the viscera, the internal milieu, and 
the musculoskeletal system to structures in the limbic system, including the hypothalamus, 
brainstem, cingulated cortex, and to some areas in the somatosensory cortices, especially the 
insular—believed to produce an emotion-relevant context for sensory experiences. Upon 
experiencing these somatic states at least once, neural patterns of the feelings are marked and 
become distinctively associated with the emotion-inducing event.  
A record of the activities in various regions such as sensory cortices and limbic system 
are held in the ventromedial PFC. When similar emotion-inducing events are subsequently 
encountered, the ventromedial PFC triggers the same feelings as the somatic states. These 
activated feelings and the accompanying somatic states influence activities in emotion-
triggering structures that generate somatic states; regions that hold patterns of somatic states, 
i.e., generate feelings; regions involved in working memory, i.e., dorsolateral PFC regions 
(Rypma, Berger, and D’Esposito, 2002) and other higher-order cortices; and regions 
concerned with behavioral and motor response (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Figure 3.4  
illustrates the mechanism of which somatic states affect decision making as proposed by 
Damasio (1994, 2003). Path A projects facts related to the choice problem, i.e., emotional-
inducing event, which include courses of action, anticipated consequences, and 
circumstances. Reasoning strategies operate on that knowledge. However, a complementary 
Path B activates feelings of prior emotional experiences of similar choice problems. The 
recalled feelings, whether conscious or unconscious, influence the decision making process 
by forcing attention on future outcomes or by interfering with reasoning strategies. If the 
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situation requires an immediate response, Path B may also lead to a decision directly. The 
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Figure 3.4: Schematic of the mechanism involved in making decision (Damasio, 
2003). 
  
3.3 Categorization and Valence of Emotions  
In most psychological studies, emotions are categorized as either positive or negative (Frijda, 
1986). For example, joy, love, and pride are considered positive emotions, while anger, 
sadness, fear, dislike, and frustration are negative emotions. Roseman (2001, p. 77) explains, 
“Positive emotions involve responses that get more of a stimulus, and negative emotions 
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involve responses that get less of a stimulus.” Therefore, this categorization assumes that the 
space of emotion is parsed according to two orthogonal dimensions: arousal, where emotion 
varies from calm to excitement, and valence, where emotion is assumed to be either pleasant 
(positive emotion) or unpleasant (negative emotion) (LaBar and Cobeza, 2006). Nonetheless, 
positively toned and negatively toned emotional states are interdependent and are not 
dichotomous (Lazarus, 2001a,b). For instance, anger is considered a negative emotion, which 
has no positive counterpart. 
Moreover, often, emotions are not experienced discretely; rather a number of 
fundamental emotions combine to form complex emotional episodes (Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 
2001a,b). For example, the emotion of Schadenfreude—i.e., malicious pleasure derived from 
the misfortune of negatively-valued others—is considered a complex emotion, of which 
some of its elements are joy and contempt (Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose, 1996).  
The most important reason for analyzing emotions is for their functional responses. 
Several emotions have been considered in the study of conflict and social interactions. By 
and large, anger, fear, sadness, contempt, and shame are some of those germane emotions 
that have been recognized by mediation practitioners and sociologists (Barker, 2003; Jones 
and Bodtker, 2001; Kemper, 1987). For example, anger and fear are considered basic 
negative emotions, which are universal across cultures and often prevail in all social 
confrontation, albeit with varying intensities. On the other hand, moral emotions, such as 
guilt, shame, jealousy, pride, and embarrassment that are believed to develop within a social 
context, form a class that is vital in regulating human social behavior (Adolphs, 2003a,b). In 





This chapter introduces the phenomenon of emotion. Various definitions for emotion from 
studies in psychology, sociology, neuroscience, and other disciplines are discussed. The 
neurobiological structures in the brain that process the exteroceptive and interoceptive 
sensory signals that activate emotion, and the accompanying homeostatic response, are 
briefly discussed. Finally, Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis and his hypotheses about of 
the mechanism of decisions making are explained. Damasio’s beliefs about the effects of 
emotion on reasoning inspire the development of the possibility principle in Chapter 5. In the 
next chapter, various definitions for conflict are discussed. Then, to emphasize the 
significance of emotion in conflict modeling, features that characterize conflict are 











Emotion: The Missing Ingredient in 
Conflict Analysis 
 
4.1 Characteristics of Conflict 
One challenge facing researchers and practitioners in negotiation and conflict resolution is 
the detection of conflict. Some specialists view conflict as a competition of opposing forces, 
for example struggles over resources, ideas, values, wishes, and needs (e.g., Burton (1996), 
Porter and Taplin (1987)). Dispute settlement practitioners (including Alternative Dispute 
Resolution) consider conflict to be a consequence of clashes of opinions, needs, and wants 
(e.g., Tillett (1991)). Behaviorists and negotiation analysts see the defining characteristic of 
conflict as the perception of divergence of interests (Thompson, 1998) or incompatibility of 
goals (Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992). Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994, p. 5) provide a more 
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detailed characterization of conflict, based on “divergence of interest, or a belief that the 
parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously.” 
Sandole (1998, p. 1) is even more comprehensive in his definition; he regards a conflict 
as a “situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, try to pursue their 
perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, each 
other’s goal-seeking capability.” Others echo this view by portraying a conflict as an 
antagonistic social situation involving individuals who perceive incompatibility over issues 
such as goals, values, interests, or beliefs, and attempt either to control each other or to 
prevent others from attaining their aspirations (e.g., Fink (1986), Fisher (1990), Folger, 
Poole, and Stutman (1993)). (Various definitions and interpretations of conflict are provided 
by authors from a range of disciplines in a set of encyclopedia articles (Hipel, 2002).) 
One difficulty in defining conflict lies in the incommensurability of terminology across 
fields of study. Does an expression of dissatisfaction, disagreement over an issue, or 
differences in opinion constitute a conflict (Costantino and Merchant, 1996; Geist, 1995)? 
For example, sometimes decision makers, who share common interests and goals, may find 
themselves in strong disagreement over resource allocation or policy making and 
implementation. Another example is differences in opinion between spouses over issues 
related to children’s education; both parents want the best for their children, yet both may 
strongly oppose the other’s ideas. In both examples, the differences in opinion may be in the 
set of criteria used to evaluate available information, differences due to subjective 
perceptions of the same issue, or differences in each party’s personal construct (Kelly, 1955).    
Various disciplines use the term conflict for different processes or events, reflecting their 
own underlying assumptions. Nonetheless, most agree that conflict is a ubiquitous and 
 
  46
inevitable phenomenon that involves a relational dynamic (Eadie and Nelson, 2001). It is a 
process rather than a situation or state of affairs, commencing with an instigating event that 
establishes issues, and then evolving through different stages. The early stages are marked by 
emotional responses, which mediate action-readiness, while strategic choices preponderate in 
later stages, with correlation between earlier and later stages. Certainly, decision making is 
an important element in this process, especially in later stages where individuals begin 
formalizing their possible choices and preferences over possible outcomes. In this process, 
emotions and the associated action-readiness have a profound affect on the shaping of 
preferences and decisions. This conceptualization is useful in keeping us away from 
preoccupation with the outcome of conflict. In other words, consideration of means must 
have the same priority as consideration of ends.  
Although there are many definitions for conflict, there is near-consensus that it is a 
process marked by psychological and sociological components, apparent in three distinct and 
fundamental characteristics: the crucial influence of perception, incompatibility of something 
of relevance, and interference; the last two features were first identified by Hammer (2001). 
To initiate a conflict, it is not the physical and social realities of a situation that are important, 
but how at least one of the parties perceives them. Perception is an active, unconscious 
inference process for information recognition, gathering, and interpretation, influenced by 
personal experience, culture, social status, and power, which regulate the attention, 
disposition, and response accorded to any stimulus (Rock, 1997). Perception may have 
nothing to do with  reality and different individuals may perceive the world differently. For 
instance, the military confrontation of 2003 between the United States and the then Iraqi 
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regime was mainly because of the former’s perception that the latter posed a grave threat to 
its National interests and securities.  
An essential characteristic of conflict involves the perception of incompatibility of 
something of relevance, at least for one party. This “thing” could be different goals, interests, 
beliefs, aspirations, or some process or service––the term goal/need will be used as shorthand 
for incompatibility. The more important this “thing” is to individuals, the more complex and 
ingrained the conflict becomes, and the harder it is to resolve. The third characteristic of 
conflict is interference, which happens when at least one party is unable to attain its goals 
independently, when that achievement is or has been undermined by others, or when the cost 
associated in achieving these goals alone is very high. Interference refers to the property of 
interdependence and interrelatedness, usually present in social interactions. The more 
interference in the conflict, the more control the parties can exert on each other’s choices, 
behavior, and goal/need satisfaction. 
 
4.2 Appraisal Theory of Emotion Activation 
4.2.1 Lazarus’s Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory 
Recent research in neurobiology and psychology has investigated the role of emotions in 
judgments, decision making, appraisal, and evaluation of options. It has been suggested that 
emotional and cognitive processes are highly interactive and have reciprocal causal relations 
(e.g., Cornelius (1996), Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000), Izard (1993), Lazarus and 
Lazarus (1994)). Hence, complex and integrative interactions of emotional, cognitive, 
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biological, and social processes are necessary for human development (Cacioppo and 
Gardner, 1999). 
Magda Arnold, in the early 1960s, debated the Darwinian (Darwin, 1873) and Jamesian 
(James, 1884) perspectives of emotion activation (Cornelius, 1996). Arnold (1960) was first 
to suggest a cognitive approach to emotion activation, namely appraisal as opposed to 
Charles Darwin’s evolved adaptations (emotions are evolved phenomena with an important 
survival function) or William James’s perception (emotional experiences were produced by 
sensing bodily changes). Arnold did not ignore the importance of an individual’s past 
experience or perception in the process of experiencing emotion, but she emphasized the 
critical role of personal relevance of the situation in relation to personal aspirations for 
emotion to be activated. Appraisal is primarily the manifestation of cognitive processes, 
which are automatic and may happen without the involvement of higher level intellectual 
processes (Cornelius, 1996).    
Features of the stimuli that activate emotions can be described as universal antecedents, 
defined in term of appraisal dimensions, which make emotions and the accompanying 
responses predictable phenomena.  In his “Laws of emotion,” Frijda (1988) studied the effect 
of cognitive appraisals and evaluation of events on emotion activation. He compiled a set of 
laws that believed to be responsible for the determination of emotional reactions and 
responses. For example, Frijda’s Law of Apparent Reality: “Emotions are elicited by events 
appraised as real, and their intensity corresponds to the degree to which this is the case” 
(Frijda, 1988, p. 352), emphasizes the importance of perception in activating emotions. 
Hence, the perception of imminent risk warrants concern even though the event did not 
actually occur.  For example, environmentalists and concerned citizens urge governments to 
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ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of greenhouse gases based on their 
perception of a global warming threat as a result of the increase in the emission of gas 
pollutants. Another law is the Law of Concern: “Emotions arise in response to events that are 
important to the individual’s goals, motives, or concerns” (Frijda, 1988, p.351).  This law 
explains, for example, why local residents reacted furiously when approximately 7,350 
hectares (73,500,000 m2) of land, encompassing the municipalities of Pickering, Markham 
and Uxbridge in the province of Ontario, were expropriated by the Government of Canada in 
early 1970s for a potential international airport site for the Greater Toronto Area. However, 
concern alone is not enough to activate emotions; the meaning of a situation is what causes 
emotions. Therefore, Frijda’s Law of Situational Meaning: “Emotions arise in response to the 
meaning structures of given situations; different emotions arise in response to different 
meaning structures” (Frijda, 1988, p. 349), explains how events that are perceived to satisfy 
an individual’s goals elicit positive emotions, whereas events that threaten the individual’s 
concerns lead to negative emotions.  
Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) view emotions as valence-based reactions to stimuli 
(events, agents, or objects), which are appraised according to an individual’s goals, standards 
and attitudes. Ortony, Clore, and Collins’ cognitive model for the effect of cognition on the 
activation of emotions, describes how cognitive processes encompass individual’s appraisals 
of events with relation to the environment. The perceived consequences of events, actions of 
others, or certain aspects of objects are appraised relative to goals, beliefs, standards, and 
attitudes; and therefore the engendered emotions are seen as essential to managing 
individual’s actions (Oatley, 1992).       
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The first elaborate appraisal theory for emotion activation is Lazarus’s Cognitive-
Motivational-Relational Theory. Its central tenet is that “relational meaning” is a function of 
the personal significance of an event, in conjunction with conditions present in the 
environment and personal goals. In other words, the personal construct of the salient features 
of the event determines the ensuing emotion (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Scherer, 2001). 
Lazarus (2001, p. 41) explains, “The premise of appraisal theory is that people and the 
infrahuman animals are constantly evaluating relationships with the environment with respect 
to their implications for personal well-being.” Lazarus (2001a,b) suggests that six appraisals, 
occurring consecutively in two steps, are responsible for eliciting and differentiating 
emotion. 
The three primary appraisal components are goal relevance, goal congruence, and type of 
ego-involvement. These appraisals focus on whether the event or situation is personally 
relevant, thereby necessitating activating emotions. The first appraisal checks whether a 
personal goal is at stake: no emotion is elicited if the event is not personally relevant. The 
second appraisal checks how the consequence of the event can be expected to thwart or 
facilitate personal goals and if the event makes it harder or easer to achieve goals. Negative 
emotions are likely to be aroused in the former case, and positive emotions in the latter. 
Finally, ego-involvement appraisal examines how the situation or its consequence is related 
to the individual’s identity, kin, or culture.  
Secondary appraisals focus on issues that help determine options for coping with the 
consequences of an event, thereby selecting the type of emotion to be activated. The first 
appraisal judges accountability for an event: that is, who or what is responsible for it. The 
perception, for example, that someone else’s premeditated event is incongruent with an 
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individual’s goal will likely make the individual angry rather than frustrated, especially if the 
event could have been avoided.  The second appraisal checks for coping potential: that is, 
how much control does the individual have over the event. Coping potential appraisal 
determines ways to restore balance, either by accepting the consequences of the event, or by 
retaliating against the perpetrator. Lazarus and Lazarus (1994, p. 18) argue, “An event may 
activate several emotions, which change over time as the personal meaning changes with 
coping actions and flow of events.” Finally, future expectation appraisal determines how 
likely the situation is to change, for better or for worse, in the future. This appraisal 
emphasizes urgency of action or avoidance strategies (Jones and Bodkter, 2001). 
 
4.2.2 Emotion Identification  
In the science of emotion, although psychologists largely agree, in the abstract, on what 
activate emotion, there is no single, unified cognitive appraisal theory. A number of 
overlapping, emotion-eliciting appraisal theories have been proposed to explain what cause 
the experience of specific emotion (e.g., Frijda (1986), Lazarus (1991), Ortony, Clore, and 
Collins (1988), Roseman (1984), Scherer (1984); Smith and Ellsworth (1985), Smith and 
Lazarus (1990)). The empirical study by Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose (1996) examined 
several alternative appraisal theories to improve the accuracy of the central appraisal 
dimensions and emotion scales. Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose (1996), Roseman (2001),  and 
Roseman and Evdokas (2004) suggest a structural theory of appraisals in which seven 
dimensions are used to determine what activate each of the seventeen emotions that are listed 
in Table 4.1: (1) unexpectedness: whether an event is unexpected or is not unexpected; (2) 
situational state: whether one wants to keep something pleasurable or get rid or avoid 
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something painful (motive-consistent/motive-inconsistent); (3) motivational state: whether 
an event will lead to getting less of something undesired or getting more of something 
desired (aversive/appetitive); (4) probability: whether the motive-relevant aspect of an event 
is merely possible or definitive (uncertain/certain); (5) agency: what or who caused the 
motive-relevant event (circumstances/other person/self); (6) control potential: can anything 
be done to the motive-relevant aspect of the event (low/high); (7) problem type: whether the 
motive-inconsistent event is unwanted because it blocks the attainment of a goal or unwanted 
because of some inherent characteristics  (behavioral/ characterological).  
The tenet of Lazarus’s appraisal theory is that emotions are the direct consequences of the 
relevant goal/need and the “coping strategy” that determines the appropriate response. 
Roseman (2001, p. 76) views these emotional responses as “interrelated and integrated,” 
forming an adaptive profile corresponding to coping strategies, as shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Adaptive Profile and Coping Strategy of Emotions (Adapted from 
Roseman, 2001) 
 Response 
Emotion Behavior Emotivation Coping Strategy 
Adaptive 
Profile 
1 Frustration Exert effort Overcome Move against it 
2 Anger Hit, criticize,  Hurt, retaliate Move against other 
3 Guilt Reproach, punish self Redress Move against self 
Collision 
4 Fear Vigilance, inhibition or 
run 
Prevent or get to safety Prepare to move away from or to 
stop moving toward it 
5 Sadness Inaction Recover Stop moving toward it 
6 Distress Move around, leave Terminate, get out Move away from it 
7 Dislike Expel Terminate, get out Move away from other 
8 Regret Do differently, do over Correct, improve Move away from self 
Avoidance  
9 Disgust Expel Terminate, get out Move it away from you 
10 Contempt Look down on, reject Exclude Move other away 
11 Shame Withdraw Get self out of sight Move self away 
Exclusion 
12 Surprise Interrupt, take 
information 
Understand Suspend action and process 
information Pose 
13 Hope Anticipate; approach Get closer, make 
happen 
Prepare to move toward, or stop 
moving away from it 
14 Relief Rest, relax Return to normal state Stop moving away from it 
15 Joy Jump, act Sustain Move toward 
16 Love Touch, hold Attach Move toward 





The perception of physical or psychological restraint from a desired goal will likely activate 
anger, especially if the obstruction has a long-term effect and is premeditated by someone 
perceived to be unfair or to have an undeserved right (Lazarus and Lazarus, 1994). 
Frustration, on the other hand, is a benign form of anger, in a situation where achieving the 
goal is merely delayed (Izard, 1977) by someone acting unintentionally, or where the 
situation could not be avoided. The coping strategy in these cases will involve an adaptive 
profile collision, corresponding to moving against the object instigating the event, thereby 
seeking to gain control of the situation and restore balance. Anger and frustration are two 
emotions that are considered under this adaptive profile because of their roles in precipitating 
hostile and aggressive actions (Izard, 1977).  The difference between these two emotions is 
that anger could lead to physical aggression with the intention of harming and defeating the 
perpetrator (Izard, 1977), whereas frustration manifests itself as a motivation to retaliate. In 
this context, the movement metaphor depicts action readiness: feelings, thoughts, and 
actions. The action tendency in the case of anger will be more hostile than when the emotion 
is frustration. 
Fear is usually felt in response to the perception of peril. The meaning centers on 
survival, security, and preservation of identity, when the threat is beyond control, unknown, 
or cannot be anticipated (Izard, 1977; Lazarus and Lazarus, 1994). The adaptive profile 
against fear is avoidance, which corresponds to moving away from the subject (Roseman, 
2001). Fear can lead to a freezing effect, making the subject impotent and unable to respond 
to the cause of the emotion. In many situations, anger is used to mask fear (Izard, 1977), and 
to mobilize retaliatory action. 
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The third adaptive profile is exclusion, which includes the emotions of disgust, contempt 
and shame. The coping strategies of these emotions involve an individual’s responses that 
exclude a stimulus (moving it away).  
Positive emotions, such as hope, relief, joy, love, and pride, have an adaptive profile of 
approaching, which corresponds to a strategy of moving toward what or who instigates the 
emotion. With these emotions, individuals are usually imbued with the sense if trust and 
content as well happy feelings. 
 
4.3 Emotion in Conflict 
The proposition that conflict is laden with negative emotion is certainly recognizable in the 
isomorphism between the three characteristics of a conflict and Lazarus’s appraisal 
dimensions. Conflict ensues when a situation or event is perceived (i.e., has relational 
meaning) as influencing a personal goal/need (i.e., is goal-relevant) in a way that makes it 
harder to achieve that goal/need (i.e., is goal incongruent).  
The secondary appraisals determine the type and intensity of negative emotion activated. 
In conflict, the perception that someone else’s action interferes with the individual’s personal 
goal/need (i.e., a judgment of accountability) is more likely to generate negative emotion 
with action tendency, such as attacking or excluding. Examples of such emotions are anger 
and contempt, depending on whether there is something that might be done (i.e., coping 
potential). High coping potential empowers an individual with options other than 
confrontation or exclusion, since he or she will be less desperate; whereas if the event is 
controlled by the self or circumstances, it is more likely that the emotion generated will be 
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characterized by an action tendency of accommodation. Examples of such emotions are guilt 
and frustration. On the other hand, the intensity of emotional experience varies with the 
momentarily perceived importance of the goals and concerns (Clore, 1994). The long term 
implication of goal/need interference determines the immediacy of the situation; the potential 
future repercussions, in turn, determine the intensity and extent of an individual’s negative 
emotion.    
The combination of these appraisals in conflict brings about a situation that is laden with 
cognitive appraisals and affective reactions (Hammer 2001). But, there are striking 
differences in peoples’ interpretations of events, which account for a diversity in the 
observed emotions (Izard, 1977). Furthermore, emotions are not equally or similarly 
manifested and influential in all conflict situations; conflict over issues that directly affect 
identity, and survival is more likely to be emotional than conflict affecting interests and 
goals. The sociological and cultural settings, therefore, of the situation are crucial in 
determining which emotions are likely to be activated, how they are experiences, interpreted, 
and expressed (Shott, 1979).  
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter introduces the postulate that emotion is an essential ingredient in conflict 
analysis. It begins by providing various meanings of conflict; then it introduces Lazarus’s 
Cognitive-Motivational-Relational theory and Roseman’s structural model of appraisals, 
which uses seven dimensions to determine the appropriate activated emotion in response to a 
stimulus. The proposition that conflict is laden with negative emotion can be inferred from 
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observing the isomorphism between the three features that cause conflict and appraisal 
dimensions for emotion activation. In the next chapter, the principle of possibility, which is 
based on Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis, is introduced to account for the effects of 
emotion in envisioning outcomes in conflict. Then, the US-North Korea dispute over nuclear 




Emotion and State Identification in 
the Graph Model  
 
5.1 Emotion Identification in Conflict 
Emotion identification is challenging and requires the use of psychometric methods in a 
laboratory environment. Typically, emotion elicitation models are based on the use of 
questionnaires or interviews. The goal of a questionnaire or an interview is to retrospectively 
identify emotion eliciting events or introspectively anticipate emotion in response to self-
observed or simulated (experimental simulation) events (Schorr, 2001). Currently, techniques 
are being developed to help psychologists in the recognition of emotions from vocal cues 
(Nakatsu, Nicholson, and Tosa, 2000; Nicholson, Takahashi, and Nakatsu, 2000) and from 
facial expressions (Granato and Bruyer, 2002). Accurate correlation of the experienced 
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emotion to a provoking event and reliable differentiation of discrete emotions (e.g., is the 
elicited emotion fear or anger?) are some of the major challenges facing psychologists in the 
identification of appraisal dimensions (Roseman, 1991).  
Furthermore, employing and appraisal model requires far knowledge about DMs: their 
deep-seated needs, their control potential (relative power), and the degree of interference 
among DMs. Fortunately, in conflict a rudimentary appraisal procedure can be used to 
determine each DM’s emotion. The three appraisal dimensions from Roseman’s structural 
theory of appraisals (Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose, 1996; Roseman, 2001; Roseman and 
Evdokas, 2004) are shown by the diamond-shaped nodes in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Model of emotion identification in conflict. 
 
By definition, a conflict is a situation in which there is a perception of motive-inconsistent 
actions among DMs. This perception causes the activation of negative emotions. 
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Differentiating the type of negative emotion requires establishing a number of checks that 
determine the appropriate adaptive profile and response strategy (see Table 4.1). First, the 
source of a motive-inconsistent action (problem source): if an opponent’s action causes the 
problem (behavioral), then an emotion with an adaptive profile of collision or avoidance is 
likely to arise. But if the problem is caused by the opponent’s character (characterological), 
then an emotion with an adaptive profile of exclusion or avoidance is more likely to ensue. A 
behavioral problem source may cause a DM to feel angry, frustrated, frightened, or sad; 
whereas, if the problem source relates to the opponent’s personality rather than his or her 
action, then the DM may experience disgust, contempt, fear, or distress. Second, the ability to 
control or eliminate a motive-inconsistent event is an indication of the degree of DM’s 
control (or coping) potential. Perceiving a high control potential is more likely to engender a 
contending emotion, such as anger, frustration, contempt, or disgust; whereas a low control 
potential is more likely to engender an accommodating emotion, such as fear, sadness, 
dislike, or distress. Finally, a DM’s ability to predict what is going to happen in the future 
(certain predictability) is likely to activate sadness, distress, or dislike, whereas, the DM’s 
inability predict the future (uncertain predictability) is more likely will activate fear.    
  
5.2 The Possibility Principle 
In social interactions, people evaluate information not only logically but also with respect to 
its ability to help achieve personal goals. Recent developments in neurobiology and 
psychology strongly reveal the inextricable association between brain structures that are 
responsible for cognitive processes, especially in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and 
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structures that are tied to processing emotion in the limbic system (Bechara and Damasio, 
2005; LeDoux, 2000). Among others, Damasio (1994, 2003) believes that reasoning is 
guided by the emotive evaluation of an action’s consequences. According to Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
and Mangun (2002, p. 450), “Limitations in information processing coupled with the need for 
expediency favor a faster [brain processing] system that can quickly eliminate actions 
associated with unpleasant consequences, while boosting those that experience has shown to 
be rewarding,” especially in their effects on social choices (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). 
Damasio (1994) suggests that the somatic markers highlight options that have positive 
predicted outcomes and inhibit any tendency to act on options with negative predicted 
outcomes. Therefore, when we face an outcome connected with a given response option, we 
experience body-related responses (i.e., feelings), negative or positive, which are associated 
with previous emotional experiences (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). These somatic markers 
facilitate decision making by influencing candidate’s responses (or choices) based on their 
affective values.  
Somatic markers serve two functions: 1) they focus attention and working memory on 
negative or positive outcomes, thus acting as a warning or incentive mechanism, and 2) they 
decrease the search space (the scope of alternatives). The somatic markers, therefore, 
increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process by automating the qualification 
of prediction mechanisms and by forcing the decision maker to scrutinize the analysis when 
an option is marked as unfavorable. 
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis that emotion influences how individuals discern 
the environment and what choices they make in social and cultural settings is used to 
incorporate emotion into the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. A new principle is 
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introduced, which is based on the proposition that the role of emotions is to focus attention 
on salient states (or options), narrowing or expanding the range of perceived states (or 
options) according to the emotion experienced. Hence, to operationalize this proposition into 
a new conceptual framework that expresses the effects of emotion in the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution, the following principle is proposed: 
The possibility principle: emotions play a central role in determining whether 
a feasible state is perceived as potential or hidden, reflecting its visibility in 
the conflict model (i.e., whether it is apprehended by the DM who controls 
transitions from the current position to his or her attainable states). 
In the option form of the graph model, relationships among a DM’s options typically 
determine the feasibility or infeasibility of states. As already discussed in Chapter 2, 
depending on the situation, constraints used in identifying infeasible states may include: (1) 
contingent options (the availability of some options is conditional on the choice of others); 
(2) mutually exclusive options (some groups of options are incompatible); (3) obligatory 
options, where at least one option must be chosen from a set.  This is called an “at least one” 
constraint (Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, and Peng, 1997).  
Hence, a feasible state is one that can be carried out or brought about without violating 
any constraints, whereas an infeasible state is one that cannot be realized. To include a 
component of emotion as proposed in the concept of possibility, a classification of the 
feasible states based on the emotional content of the situation is proposed. The conventional 
set of feasible states, ,S  is partitioned, for each DM ,i N∈  into the three subsets, as 




Figure 5.2: The possibility principle. 
 
1. Hidden states, ,iH  which cannot occur due to the presence of negative emotion 
that have adaptive profiles of avoidance and collision, such as fear and anger, 
respectively. It is unlikely that DM i will apprehend hidden states unless certain 
strong negative emotions have been diminished. In other words, a hidden state is 
invisible for a DM and a rejected possibility; negative emotion blocks it. 
2. Potential states, ,iP  which cannot occur due to the lack of positive emotion 
necessary to allay concerns and disseminate trust among DMs (Dunn and 
Schweitzer, 2005). It is unlikely that DM i will consider these states unless he or 
she is emotionally motivated. Hence, expressing the appropriate positive emotion, 
such as joy and love, enables DM i  to discern potential states.  
3. Recognized states, ,iS  consisting of all states of S not included in iH or .iP  
These states may not be uniformly discernable to all DMs. Different recognized 
state sets may exist in a conflict model for each DM, dependent on which sets are 
categorized hidden and potential. 
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Emotion, therefore, plays a central role as a graph modifier in conflict analysis.  
Accordingly, we can surmise that positive emotion will make the set of potential states 
visible, and thereby expand the graph model of the conflict. Negative emotion, especially 
negative emotion with an adaptive profile of avoidance, such as fear, dislike, distress, and 
sadness, makes the set of hidden states invisible and thereby restricts a graph model of the 
conflict. The main difference between potential and hidden states is that the former are 
invisible due to missing emotions, usually positive emotions that promote trust and rapport 
among decision makers, while the latter are invisible due to the presence of negative 
emotions such as anger, frustration, and fear. 
With one exception, the suggested categorization of the effects of negative and positive 
emotion on the graph model is common. In certain emotional conflicts, a self-destructive 
future may be a state recognized by a DM because of the presence of intense anger, provided 
that this future engenders short-term gains with a sense of glorification or martyrdom. For 
example, the DM may inflict grave harm and pain upon other DMs irrespective of the long-
term consequences of such an act. Notwithstanding, the same future may be hidden to other 
DMs because of fear. Thus, an angry suicide bomber under the illusion of martyrdom resorts 
to a dramatic act that hurts an opponent, even though he or she knows that vengeance will 
follow. 
Awareness of the presence and causes of emotions in the conflict and an empathetic 
understanding of their affects on DMs’ perceptions provide more realistic and expedient 
integration of the possibility principle into the Graph Model methodology. To identify states 
that are reasonable and emotionally harmonious from the point of view of each DM, usually 
least preferred states are candidates for elimination. This has the effect of restricting the set 
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of feasible states as per each DM’s perception of the conflict. Rigorous sensitivity analyses 
of the model can be used to examine whether assumptions about hidden and potential states 
affect the results of a stability analysis. For instance, if the results do not change 
substantially, then accounting for DMs’ emotions in the conflict makes the graph model 
simpler but keeps the results intact. On the other hand, if the results change, then the analyst 
should be cautious about removing states from the graph model and seek further information.   
 
5.3 Case Study: US-North Korea Conflict 
5.3.1 Standard Modeling and Analysis 
The end of the Korean War (1950-1953) reinforced the division of the Korean peninsula both 
geographically, into North and South, and ideologically, into totalitarian and quasi-
democratic. For almost fifty years, the hostile relationship between the United States of 
America (US) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been ascribed to 
enmity. Recently, the tension surrounding this relationship heightened sharply. Despite its 
economic devastation, North Korea strengthened its military. Defying the US, North Korea 
admitted to having a secret uranium enrichment program and started reprocessing fuel rods at 
its nuclear complex at Yongbyon, which would produce weapons-grade plutonium. It also 
continued developing long-range ballistic missiles. 
Officials in the US government have routinely characterized Pyongyang as a threat to the 
US’s national interests and emphasized the need for preemptive, decisive attacks to thwart 
North Korea. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the US administration became 
very aggressive on national security issues. Foreign policy was based on a preemptive 
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defense doctrine, and the slogan “you are either with us or against us,” provided no assurance 
or comfort to friends or foes. The US fears North Korea may sell nuclear technologies to 
countries such as Iran, Syria, and Libya, for hard currency, and may even supply nuclear 
weapons to terrorists. 
As of June 2003, North Korea had two options: abandon its nuclear weapons program by 
freezing all development activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the highly 
enriched uranium program; or curtail its conventional weapons program by reducing 
spending and stopping the production, testing, deployment, and sale of ballistic missiles. On 
the other hand, the US has three options: engage in direct negotiation with North Korea; 
adopt an aggressive approach perhaps including a military strike; and continue pressuring 
North Korea through sanctions and isolation, countering South Korea’s Sunshine Policy that 
seeks social and economical integration in the Korean peninsula. The left column in Table 
5.1 lists the two decision makers and their options. 
 
Table 5.1: Decision Makers and Option in the US-North Korea Conflict 




1. Abandon: stop its nuclear weapon program N 
2. Curtail: reduce its conventional weapons program  N 
North Korea’s 
Strategy 
US   
3. Negotiate: engage in direct negotiations with North Korea N 
4. Attack: adopt an aggressive, military posture N 
5. Pressure: influence North Korea through sanctions and isolation Y 
US’s Strategy 
  
A state (or policy scenario) is defined as a column of Ys and Ns, where a “Y” opposite an 
option means the option is selected, and an “N” means the option is rejected. For example, 
the column with four Ns followed by one Y, shown in Table 5.1, is the status quo state, in 
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which North Korea has adopted the strategy of not taking any of its options while the US is 
pressuring North Korea by selecting option 5. 
In this conflict model, there are 32 (25) mathematically-defined states. However, many of 
these states are infeasible. Those states that contain mutually exclusive options (e.g., US 
attacks and negotiates) or highly unlikely strategies (e.g., US attacks or pressures and North 
Korea abandons or curtails) must be removed. Table 5.2 shows the decision makers and the 
feasible states; as noted, state 10 is the status quo at the time of modeling. 
 
Table 5.2: Feasible States in the US-North-Korea Conflict 
 States 
North Korea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Abandon N Y N Y N Y N Y N N N N 
2. Curtail N N Y Y N N Y Y N N N N 
US             
3. Negotiate N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y N 
4. Attack N N N N N N N N Y N N Y 
5. Pressure N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y 
 
The preference structure of each DM among feasible states is expressed ordinally by ranking 
the states from the most to the least preferred, where ties are allowed. Note that US policy 
towards North Korea is assumed to be hostile, with no consideration given to North Korea’s 
fundamental needs. Table 5.3 shows each DM’s preferences––from most preferred states at 
the top to least preferred at the bottom. Equally preferred states are shown in the same row. 
(The symbol  indicates the direction of a DM’s preference between two states; for example 





Table 5.3: Decision Makers’ Relative Ranking of States 
North Korea Preference Ranking States 
US: Negotiate unconditionally 5 
US: Negotiate and Pressure unconditionally 11 
Do nothing 1 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Abandon or Curtail 7,6,8 
Status Quo 10 
US: Attack 9,12 
US: Do nothing and North Korea: Abandon or Curtail 3,2,4 
US Preference Ranking States 
North Korea: Abandon or Curtail unconditionally 4,2,3 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Abandon or Curtail 8,6,7 
Do nothing 1 
US: Negotiate and Pressure unconditionally 11 
US: Attack and Pressure 12 
US: Attack 9 
Status Quo 10 
US: Negotiate unconditionally 5 
 
The integrated graph model for the conflict is shown in Figure 5.3, where the number shown 
in a node refers to the feasible state defined in Table 5.2, and each DM’s preferences are 
expressed below the graph by ranking the states from most preferred on the far left to least 
preferred on the far right, where equally preferred states are contained within parentheses. 
The arcs represent the unilateral moves by each DM from one state to another. For example, 
the arc from state 10 to state 9 in Figure 5.3 represents the US moving in one step from the 
status quo to a strategy of attacking, while North Korea does not change its options. It is 
assumed that the US attack option is irreversible; once it has been selected, there is no way 
back––the damage is done. An inherent advantage of the graph model is that it directly 
accounts for such irreversible moves. One point is repeated for emphasis: all DMs’ graphs 
have the same set of states, which reflects the implicit assumption that all DMs have the 




NK NK NK NK NK NK5 11 1 (7,6,8) 10 (9,12) (3,2,4)
US US US US US US US(4,2,3) (8,6,7) 1 11 12 9 10 5  
Figure 5.3: Standard graph model for the US-North Korea conflict. 
 
For convenience, the decision support system GMCR II (Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 2003a,b; 
Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, and Peng, 1997) is used to analyze the current conflict model according 
to different solution concepts. As shown in Table 5.4,  the analysis reveals the equilibria are 
states 1 (do nothing) and 12 (US attack and pressure), which are stable for all solution 
concepts; states 6 and 8, which are stable for general metarationality and sequential stability; 
and state 7, which is stable for all solution concepts except Nash Stability. 
However, this model is unrealistic in certain important ways. The ‘do nothing’ option 
will give North Korea the time it needs for the development of its enriched uranium program, 
while an ‘attack’ could usher the world into a nuclear catastrophe––neither state is a 
preferred resolution of the US. Accordingly, the effect of emotions is considered next in the 
conflict model using the possibility principle. 
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Table 5.4: Equilibria for the US-North Korea Conflict Model 
 States 
North Korea 1 6 7 8 12 
1. Abandon N Y N Y N 
2. Curtail N N Y Y N 
US      
3. Negotiate N Y Y Y N 
4. Attack N N N N Y 
5. Pressure N N N N Y 
Solution Concepts      
Nash Equilibrium √    √ 
General Metarationality √ √ √ √ √ 
Symmetric 
Metarationality 
√  √  √ 
Sequential Stability √ √ √ √ √ 
Limited-move Stability √  √  √ 
Nonmyopic Stability √  √  √ 
 
5.3.2 The Possibility Principle in the US-North Korea Conflict Model 
The relationships between the US and North Korea went through a cycle of policies of 
containment, engagement, and confrontation, but an element that remained constant was 
emotion. To a large degree, and for different reasons, the policies of both DMs are 
influenced, guided, and managed by the emotions of fear and anger. North Korea alleges that 
its nuclear and missile programs do not serve any immediate political or offensive purpose––
rather, they are viewed by the DRPK as essential for survival in the long term (Laney and 
Shaplen, 2003). Many analysts believe that it is highly unlikely North Korea will use nuclear 
weapons against the US unless the regime in Pyongyang is imperiled (Bennett, 2003; Feffer, 
2002); the missile program is a source for hard currency that sustains Kim Jong Il in power. 
The US-led war against the former Iraqi regime reinforced North Korea’s sense of its 
vulnerability, and its hostile attitude toward the US. On April 7, 2003, the Korean Central 
News Agency (KCNA) reported that a Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated:  “Only the 
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physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively 
beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the 
security of the country and the nation. This is a lesson drawn from the Iraqi war.” 
Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has eschewed any direct negotiation 
with Pyongyang, while maintaining hostile rhetoric against North Korea. According to the 
September 2002 document “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” 
(The White House, 2002), the US fears a new form of threat, terrorists using weapons of 
mass destruction. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush labeled 
North Korea a member of the “axis of evil,” along with Iraq and Iran. The US believes that 
its security interests are threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons and missile 
technology. Moreover, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons will encourage other 
states to do likewise; the US and other powers worked hard to stop nuclear proliferation 








To account for the role of emotion in the conflict model, the sets of potential and hidden 
states are defined and included in the conflict model, as shown in Figure 5.4. States 6, 7, and 
8 are those in which the US engages in direct negotiation with North Korea, perhaps 
motivating North Korea to abandon or curtail its nuclear and missile programs. Unless the 
US can address Kim Jong Il’s fears by recognizing the legitimacy of the ruling regime (for 
example, by entering into a nonaggression pact with North Korea), these states are not visible 
to North Korea. Only by building confidence and trust and by committing to address North 
Korea’s economic and security needs will these states become realistic. The US can start by 
supporting South Korea’s Sunshine policy, changing its hostile posture, and agreeing to 
engage in sincere negotiations. 
States 2, 3, and 4 (see Table 5.2) are hidden to North Korea, because of years of enmity 
and distrust. At these states, North Korea unconditionally abandons or curtails its nuclear and 
missile programs. However, fear and anger make these states invisible and hence 
unrealizable. Although it is possible that the inability to perceive some states may change a 
DM’s relative preferences over the remaining states, it is assumed here that the DM’s 
preference between perceived states will be unchanged. Figure 5 depicts the new conflict 
model with the two sets of states disappearing from the model. Only the US controls 
movements in this model. 
Analyzing this new model using GMCR II reveals that states 1 and 12 are still equilibria 
and stable for all solution concepts. The conflict model has degenerated to a single decision 
maker problem, as the US controls all available state-to-state transitions. As controlling DM, 
the US can either appease North Korea (by doing nothing) or it can deliver a military strike. 
Both resolutions would be dreadful. In reality, North Korea is sending ambiguous messages 
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about its intentions and at the same time is continuing to develop its weapons program. 
Meanwhile, the US is avoiding direct negotiations on the grounds that the problem of nuclear 
proliferation concerns the entire Korean peninsula and the region, and therefore requires a 
multilateral framework. The new conflict model gives a more realistic picture of the severity 
of the situation. Without considering the role of emotions, the results in Table 5.4 may give 
the wrong impression––states 6, 7, and 8 are attractive to the US but only a mirage––visible 
to the US only. North Korea will not consider abandoning or curtailing its weapons programs 
while the US is showing a hostile posture toward it. Unless the US starts considering North 










NK NK NK NK5 11 1 10 (9,12)North Korea’s relative preference ranking of states
US US US US US1 11 12 9 10 5US’s relative preference ranking of states  
Figure 5.5: Modified graph model for the US-North Korea conflict model. 
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5.3.3 A Breakthrough in the Situation! 
On August 27, 2003, delegates from North Korea, South Korea, USA, Japan, China, and 
Russia met in Beijing, China in six-way talks to discuss the tension in the Korean peninsula. 
Assistant State Secretary James Kelly, head of the US delegation, stated that US willingness 
to discuss security assurance and political and economical benefits for North Korea is 
conditional upon complete, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear 
programs (BBC News, 2003). The US, according to Kelly, does not consider a non-
aggression treaty as appropriate or necessary, and therefore will not pursue one.  
North Korea, on the other hand, demanded that the US terminate its hostile policy toward 
the DPRK as a precondition for discussing further matters related to its nuclear programs. 
Only after the US removes North Korea from its “axis of evil” list and signs a non-aggression 
agreement will the latter consider dismantling its nuclear programs, according to North 
Korea’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. China, Russia, and South Korea urged the US and 
North Korea to work out a simultaneous process for solving the nuclear issue, stressing the 
importance of signing a non-aggression treaty as a trust-building bridge to complete 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and economic prosperity in the whole region 
(KCNA, 2003). As a demonstration of good faith, North Korea allowed a group of American 
experts to visit Yongbyon in January 2004 to prove that it has developed weapons-grade 
plutonium. Simultaneously, the Bush administration played down its aggressive tone and 
war-drums rhetoric, at least in the media. Perhaps there are steps each party can take in order 
to break the standoff. 
The US can alleviate North Korea’s concerns by agreeing to engage in direct talks with 
North Korea, under the umbrella of the six-way meeting. This means that the US will 
sincerely consider abandoning its hostile posture in an effort to gain North Korea’s trust. Not 
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only will that make the possible states 6, 7, and 8 visible, but the preference structures of 
both players will change as well. The new preference ranking of both DMs is shown in Table 
5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Decision Makers' New Relative Preference Ranking of States 
North Korea Preference Ranking States 
US: Negotiate unconditionally 5 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Curtail 7 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Abandon 6 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Abandon and Curtail 8 
Do nothing 1 
US:  Negotiate and Pressure unconditionally 11 
Status Quo 10 
US: Attack 9.12 
US Preference Ranking States 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Abandon and Curtail 8 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Abandon 6 
US: Negotiate and North Korea: Curtail 7 
US: Negotiate unconditionally 5 
Do nothing 1 
US: Negotiate and Pressure unconditionally 11 
Status Quo 10 
US: Attack and Pressure 12 
US: Attack 9 
 
Analyzing the new conflict model reveals possible resolutions that were not available in the 
original model, as shown in Table 5.6. The most important revelations are the stabilities of 
states 5 and 7, where the US accepts direct negotiations with North Korea. In state 5, the US 
move is unconditional, but aimed to induce North Korea to abandon or curtail its weapons 






Table 5.6: New Equilibria for the US-North Korea Conflict Model 
 States 
North Korea 5 7 12
1. Abandon N N N 
2. Curtail N Y N 
US    
3. Negotiate Y Y N 
4. Attack N N Y 
5. Pressure N N Y 
Solution Concepts    
Nash Equilibrium √  √ 
General Metarationality √ √ √ 
Symmetric Metarationality √ √ √ 
Sequential Stability √  √ 
Limited-move Stability √  √ 
Nonmyopic Stability √  √ 
 
5.3.4 Insights 
The integrative analysis approach to the US-North Korea conflict, in which both emotions 
and reasoning are studied empathetically using the graph model for conflict resolution, is 
simple and consistent with reality. North Korea refuses to capitulate to US demands, and 
engages diplomatically with its neighboring countries China, Russia, South Korea and, to a 
lesser degree, Japan, in an effort to build a legitimate rationale for its cause. The US, on the 
other hand, justifies its policy toward North Korea within the context of its “war on 
terrorism.” It refuses direct negotiations in an effort to internationalize the problem of nuclear 
weapons proliferation in the Korean peninsula.   
The opportunity for dialogue was missed, however. In February 2005, the US Secretary 
of State called North Korea an “outpost of tyranny” and the US alleged that North Korea had 
sold uranium hexafluoride, which can be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, to 
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Libya in 2001. North Korea responded by pulling out of the six-way talks and announcing 
that it has indeed built nuclear weapons (Economist, 2005).    
If anything is to be learned in this case, it is that this conflict goes beyond what normal 
analysis would reveal. The struggle is over identity, self-definition, and projection into the 
future, all ideas that are full of emotion. If Kim Jong Il does not maintain his power and his 
self-definition, he will not survive. The US’s main objectives are self-definition and 
projection into the future as a means for increasing its security and economic and military 
superiority. North Korea’s apparently irrational behavior could be attributed to a coping 
strategy intended to protect and restore balance to an ego, in response to fear of the US.   
 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter extends the state identification step of the Graph Model methodology to include 
a postulate based on Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. The possibility principle 
emphasizes the centrality of emotion in determining the visibility of states to a DM. The 
importance of somatic markers for making decisions is discussed. To demonstrate the new 
principle, the US-North Korea conflict is detailed and analyzed as an illustrative case. To 
account for DMs’ inconsistent perceptions of a conflict, perceptual graph models and the 
associated graph model system are defined in the next Chapter. Then, perceptual stability 
analysis of the graph model system is described. The Chechnya conflict is used to illustrate 









The possibility principle provides a framework to account for the role of emotion in strategic 
conflict. Subjective perceptions of particular outcomes are incorporated into a conflict model 
by eliminating logically valid states that are not apprehended by the DM or exposing states 
that are otherwise invisible. Not only may this simplify the conflict model substantially, 
expedite the analysis, and make it more intuitive, but also it will make the model a more 
realistic description of the DM’s conceptualization of the conflict.    
To incorporate the possibility principle within the Graph Model methodology, the steps 
depicted in the flow diagram in Figure 2.2 are slightly modified to use the information 
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obtained about DMs’ emotions at the modeling stage. Figure 6.1 shows how the flow 
diagram is augmented to include the possibility principle. Steps 1 to 3 produce the usual set 
of DMs’ directed graphs, which can be integrated. A complete standard graph model for the 
conflict is obtained using every DM’s relative preferences with respect to the feasible states 
with the integrated graph (Step 4). Applying the possibility principle in Step 5 may modify 
the directed graphs by expanding or restricting the set of feasible states according to the 
DMs’ emotions. 
 































State transitions may also be affected by this modification, since they are specified by a 
controlling DM’s unilateral move from one state (source) to another (destination). If either 
state is removed from the model then the associated state transition must be dropped; 
whereas if a new state is introduced, the required means to reach that state may not be readily 
visible to any particular DM. Transitions to or from that state, therefore, are not necessarily 
available to that DM.  Take for instance a bloody conflict between two DMs. Negative 
emotions may prevent the DMs from realizing the means to reach a peaceful resolution, 
albeit both would agree that such an outcome would be in their best interests.  
Preference information is essential in the assessment of stability of states. DMs’ 
preferences are less susceptible to changes in the set of feasible states. Relative preference 
relations among states are assumed to be preserved, and, hence, the modified graph inherits 
the preference information from the standard model. Consequently, modifying the set of 
feasible states indirectly alters the state transitions and the pairwise comparisons of states 
with respect to preference, which ultimately changes the graph model.  
Heretofore, it was assumed that all DMs have identical state sets, which reflects the 
implicit assumption that all DMs are sympathetic to each others’ emotions and thereby have 
unequivocally identical views of the possible states of the interaction. Naturally, this 
assumption allows all DMs’ individual directed graphs to be combined into a unique 
integrated graph model for the conflict and facilitates stability analysis. In the US-North 
Korea conflict described in Section 5.3, for example, all directed graphs were integrated as 
shown in Figure 5.3, and stability analyses of states were based on the standard solution 
concepts discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. But this idealization may simplify a graph 
model embeded with the possibility principle to the extent that its application to real-world 
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conflict is hindered. Generally, emotion engendered in conflict may impair a DM’s tendency 
to identify with opponents and ability to assess strategy combinations objectively. Hence, 
each DM develops a viewpoint that reflects its personal rendition of the conflict.   
A practical model that reconciles emotion and strategy must, therefore, allow for DMs to 
have different apprehensions of the underlying decision problem, which violates a 
fundamental tenet of Graph Model methodology—that all DMs’ directed graphs have 
identical sets of vertices (states). A perceptual system for modeling and analysis can 
accommodate the possibility principle within the Graph Model, allowing each DM to 
experience and view the conflict independently, without the need for complete awareness of 
others’ perceptions. To guarantee this flexibility, it will be assumed that each DM is at best 
empathetic with his or her opponents. 
Figure 6.2 is a flow diagram that shows how the possibility principle can be applied using 
a perceptual mapping of the standard graph model. The perceptual mapping process creates a 
perceptual (integrated) graph model for each DM. This model inherits its primitive 
information (ingredients) from the standard graph model. But inconsistencies in 
apprehending outcomes necessitate modification of the set of feasible states to reflect each 
DM’s emotion and perception. Consequently, the perceived state transitions and the 






































Figure 6.2: Flow diagram for incorporating the role of emotion in changing decision 
makers’ perceptions of states in the Graph Model. 
 
6.2 Formal Definitions 
6.2.1 Standard Graph Model 
The primitives of a graph model include DMs and states. A standard graph model can be 
expressed by a quartet of components: 
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 ( ) ( ), , , ii i N i NG N S A ∈ ∈⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  (0.1) 
The set of all DMs is ,N where 2 .N≤ < ∞    For convenience, assume {1, 2, ..., }.N n=  S  
is the set of states, where 2 .S≤ <∞  The states represent feasible, distinguishable outcomes 
or scenarios of the conflict, and are thought of as the vertices of each DM’s directed graph. 
One of the states, 0 ,s  is designated as the status quo, or initial state, and the conflict evolves 
as individual DMs unilaterally cause transitions among states. Formally, for each DM ,i N∈  
1 2 1 2 1 2{( , ) : , , }iA S S s s s s S s s⊂ × = ∈ ≠   is the set of state transitions or arcs controlled by 
i.  For 1 2,s s S∈ and 1 2s s≠  (i.e., no loops are allowed), 1 2( , )s s  is an arc in DM i’s directed 
graph ( , )iS A  if DM i can cause, in one step, a transition from state 1s  to state 2.s  In this 
case, 2s  is reachable for i from 1.s   
An additional component of a graph model is each DM’s preferences among states. A 
DM’s preference can be expressed in a relative fashion by pairwise comparisons of states, 
whereby a DM prefers one state more than another or is indifferent between them. In general, 
for each DM ,i N∈ a complete and reflexive weak preference relation i  expresses each 
DM’s preferences over .S  i  can be decomposed into a pair of binary relations { , }.i i∼  
Conventionally, DM i  strictly prefers 1s  to 2 ,s  written 2 1,is s   if and only if 2 1is s  but 
not 1 2.is s   Also, DM i  is indifferent between 2s  and 1s  then 1 2 ,is s∼  if and only if 2 1is s  
and 1 2.is s   These relationships possess the following properties: 




2. i∼  is reflexive and symmetric; i.e., for any 1 2, ,s s S∈  1 1,is s∼   and  if  1 2is s∼  
then 2 1.is s∼  
3. { , }i i∼  is complete; i.e., for any 1 2, ,s s S∈  then at least one of 1 2 ,is s 2 1,is s  
or 1 2is s∼  is true. 
Preference information can be either transitive or intransitive. Whatever the case, both the 
graph model and the procedures developed in this chapter can be conveniently employed for 
modeling and analysis. In fact, in real world conflicts relative preference relationships among 
states are often transitive, which allow expressing DMs’ preferences by ranking (ordering) 
the states for each DM from most to least preferred, where ties are allowed. 
In the graph model, ,G  DM i’s graph is the directed graph ( , )iS A , and S is common to 
all DMs. In this sense, the graph model is a directed graph with multiple arcs, in which each 
arc is labeled with the name of the DM who controls it. 
 
6.2.2 Perceptual Graph Model and Graph Model System 
Incorporating emotion within the Graph Model methodology requires partitioning the set of 
states, ,S  into three subsets: hidden, potential, and recognized. When logically possible 
states are no longer achievable for one or more DMs due to emotions, the apprehension of a 
conflict becomes inconsistent, and resolution may become difficult to predict.  Hence, it is 
appropriate to model the conflict using a perceptual graph for each DM to allow for 
differences in the DMs’ perceptions. In a standard graph model, DMs’ graphs are integrated 
into a unified model. But with inconsistent perceptions, each DM’s viewpoint defines an 
entire conflict model.  
 
  84
The underlying principle of the perceptual graph model system is that the DMs’ 
perceptions must be the basis for analysis. Even when 2,n =  in addition to the focal DM i 
and the opponent j, DM k is introduced to keep track of who owns the perceptual graph. 
Therefore, DM k’s set of recognized states defines k’s perceptual graph model, which is 
generally a private model.  
Formally, for each DM ,k N∈  let kS S⊆  be k’s set of recognized states, where kS  is 
formed by eliminating from S  k’s hidden and potential states.  Note that kS  reflects k’s 
perception—in particular, some states may not be discernible to all DMs in a model. Usually, 
it is assumed that ,kS ≠ ∅  for otherwise DM k would not apprehend that he or she has a 
stake in the conflict, and thereby ;k N∉  in fact, it is assumed that 0 .ks S∈   Similarly, for 
DMs , ,i k N∈  define kiS  as DM k’s perception of i’s state set, and note that .
k
i kS S⊆  As a 
special case, if the focal DM is the owner of the perceptual graph, then ,k i=  so  .ii iS S=  
For , ,i k N∈  define kiA as DM k’s  perception of i’s  state transitions. 
k
iA  consists of 
the arcs of  DM i’s directed graph, ,iA  which are wholly contained within DM k’s set of 
recognized states.  For  ,k i=  ii iA A=  which represents DM i’s arcs contained in .iS  
Generally, ,k k ki i iA S S⊂ ×  and can be expressed as  {( , ) : , , }.
k k
i i iA s t A s t S s t= ∈ ∈ ≠   
Similarly, for , ,i k N∈ let ki  be DM k’s perception of i’s relative preferences among 
states.  The perceived weak preference relation, ,ki  represents the restriction of i  on ,kS  
and expresses i’s preference over ,kS  as perceived by DM k.  
k
i  has the same properties as  
i ;  it is reflexive and complete.  
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Furthermore, a perceptual graph model has to keep track of what each DM knows.  
Conclusions drawn from analyzing a perceptual graph model are conditional upon a DM’s 
awareness of opponents’ perceptions of his or her set of recognized states. A DM who is 
aware of others’ lack of perception of some states may have an upper hand in the conflict. 
On the other hand, a DM who is unaware of others’ lack of perception will be under the 
impression that his or her model is a standard graph model. An indicator of a DM’s 
awareness will be used to distinguish between these two cases. For DM k let kα  be an index 
that represents DM k’s awareness of whether other DMs’ inconspicuous states are included 
in his or her perceptual graph model, as follows: 
 
DM  is unaware that other DMs perceive different graph models.0








Consequently, for ,i k N∈ define DM k’s  perceptual graph model as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,kk k ik i i ki N i N i NG N S A α∈ ∈ ∈⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  (0.3) 
where: 
N   is a finite set of DMs; 2 .N≤ < ∞  
k
iS  is DM k’s perception of i’s states; .
k
i kS S⊆  
k
iA  is DM k’s perception of i’s transitions among states. 
k
i  is DM k’s perception of i’s preferences.  




In ,kG  DM k’s viewpoint reflects his or her strategic and behavioral dispositions. All DMs’ 
perceptions are accounted for by defining, for every DM in ,N  a private, perceptual graph. 
A graph model system consists of a list of all DMs’ perceptual graph models: 
 ( )1 2, , ..., , ...,k nG G G G G=  (0.4) 
The standard model represents a “realistic,” emotionless view, which would apply if 
perceptions were consistent. It records states, state transitions, and preference information, 
which are then inherited by the graph model system. Hence, each perceptual graph model in 
the system is a sub-model that shares some features of the standard graph model. 
Commonalities among perceptual graph models may be the result of either compassionate or 
emotionless DMs.  In the former case, all DMs share the same view, i.e., 
1 2 ... ,nG G G G= = = =  while in the latter case there is only one underlying standard model. 
In general, the way each DM views the conflict may be explained by a mapping process 
that depends on the DM’s temperament. This mapping process may elicit an equally 
perceived, under-perceived, or over-perceived graph. An emotionless DM has a perceptual 
graph that is a replica of the standard graph model, whereas an emotional DM’s mapping 
may transpose a standard graph into an under-perceived perceptual graph model. The 
mapping process in this case is represented by an emotive mapping function, .ξ   For DM 
k N∈ define kξ  as the process that maps all information in the standard graph model into 
DM k’s perceptual graph, written as: ( ).k kG Gξ=   Similarly, the emotive mapping function 
is applied to states ( ( )k kS Sξ= ), state transitions ( ( )
k
i k iA Aξ= ), and preferences 
( ( )ki ikξ= ). On the other hand, an attentive DM’s mapping process may produce an over-
perceived graph that contains more states than the standard graph model. Such a DM may be 
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motivated by an urge for vengeance or altruism. For instance, hatred or ignorance motivate a 
terrorist to perpetrate an atrocity even though its outcome might reasonably be deemed 
infeasible, while a propitiator will attempt to find innovative states in an effort to bring about 
rapprochement. 
 
6.3 Stability Analysis of a Graph Model System 
6.3.1 General Principles 
The first principle of stability analysis is: a state is stable for a DM if and only if the DM has 
no incentive to move away from it, should it be attained.  In other words, lack of incentive to 
move away from a state is necessary and sufficient for it to be stable for a DM. Incentive is 
determined by calculations that measure the likely success of any effort by the DM to attain a 
preferred outcome. These calculations reflect the availability of inducements and deterrents. 
An inducement is a unilateral improvement from the state under investigation, while a 
deterrent is a sanction which could be levied by an opponent, moving the conflict to an at-
best equally preferred state for the focal DM. What constitutes an inducement and a deterrent 
depends upon the solution concept used. 
Some of the requisites that may be incorporated into a stability assessment of a state s  
for a DM are the following: a state t  adjacent to ;s  departure from s  to t  must be 
controlled by the DM; the move from  s  to t  must represent an improvement for the DM 
(i.e., a unilateral improvement, UI); a deterrent against a UI that could be levied by an 
opponent (i.e., a sanction);  an opponent who prefers to execute the sanction (i.e., its 
credibility); and the availability of an escape from the sanction.  Moreover, a stable state, 
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under a particular solution concept, becomes an equilibrium should the DM also believe that 
other DMs likewise prefer to stay at that state. 
The second principle of stability analysis pertains to the visibility of a state. A state that is 
inconspicuous to all DMs, though logically valid, must be dropped from the standard graph 
model. Accordingly, is S∉  for all i N∈  is equivalent to .s S∉  On the other hand, a state 
that is recognized by a DM and stable for the DM under a particular solution concept in the 
graph model system must be stable for that DM in the standard graph model under that 
solution concept. (A mathematical proof for this statement is provided in Section 6.7) 
Similarly, a state that is recognized and unstable under a particular solution concept for a DM 
in the graph model system must be unstable in the standard graph model for that DM under 
that solution concept. 
Two important assumptions make it easier to define perceptual solution concepts and 
carry out meta-stability analysis. First, although no DM knows exactly any other DM’s 
model, and therefore cannot take advantage of this knowledge, a DM may be aware of states 
in his or her perceptual graph model that are not recognized by other DMs. Second, all DMs 
recognize the status quo state ( i.e., 0 is S∈  for all )i N∈ .   
The perceptual graph model of  DM k  must be built using k’s set of recognized states, 
.kS  To avoid trivialities, assume that 1 2 ... .nS S S S=∪ ∪ ∪  Note that 
1 2 ...
C
nS S S S= ≠ ∅∩ ∩ ∩  because 0 .
Cs S∈  The set CS is the set of commonly perceived 
states, and Ct S∈ means that the state t  is recognized by every DM in .N  Similarly, define 
C
kj k jS S S= ∩  to be the set of states common to the DMs  k  and  j,  and  
P
kj k jS S S= ∩  to be 
the set of states recognized by k  but not j,  where  jS  is the complement of jS  in .S  Also, 
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the set of states private to DM k is 1 2 1... ...
P
k k k k nS S S S S S S+= ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ .  If the index 
of awareness of DM k is 0kα = , then k will not be aware of these private states, i.e., 
P
kS = ∅ . 
 
6.3.2 Standard Stability Analysis 
A standard graph model provides a convenient formalization for modeling a strategic 
conflict. It also provides procedures for assessing stability of states, based on various solution 
concepts (stability definitions) defined within the Graph Model structure. These procedures 
represent each DM’s readiness and strategic approach to behavior in the conflict. 
Stability analysis means examining the stability of every state under a particular solution 
concept for each DM. A solution concept is a set of rules for identifying a state that a DM 
would stay at, given that the state has been attained. A state that is stable for all DMs in the 
standard graph model, ,G  is called an equilibrium, and is considered a predicted resolution 
for the conflict. Commonly used solution concepts include Nash stability (Nash), general 
metarationality (GMR), sequential stability (SEQ), and symmetric metarationality (SMR). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, states that are stable under many solution concepts are usually 
preferred as they are consistent with a broader range of decision styles and attitudes to risk. 
 
6.3.3 Perceptual Stability Analysis  
Stability analysis in the Graph Model methodology is based on the assumption that all 
decision makers share the same standard graph model. This conventional view becomes 
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inappropriate for perceptual graph models, necessitating a new analysis procedure applicable 
to graph model systems. 
When there are discrepancies in perceptions, conclusions drawn by analyzing a graph 
model system must depend upon who is doing the analysis (and with what information). 
Although some DMs may unknowingly share the same perception, it is assumed that each 
DM’s perceptual graph model is private and concealed (i.e., no other DM has knowledge of 
it), and according to the DM, is the correct representation for the conflict. There is a 
fundamental requirement, therefore, that whoever does the analysis can use only his or her 
own information, which consists of perceived states, perceived state transitions, perceived 
preferences, and any awareness that the analyst may have of states that are inconspicuous to 
opponents. Hence, each DM sees his or her model as the standard model, which gives the 
DM a very simple view of other DMs’ perceptual graphs (i.e., other graphs are sub-models of 
the DM’s model). By analyzing his or her graph using a particular solution concept, a DM 
highlights the states that are stable for each DM under that solution concept, which may not 
be consistent with those identified by other DMs.  
The main objective in perceptual stability analysis is to help an outside analyst, who will 
analyze each DM’s perceptual graph, from that DM’s own point of view, to predict possible 
resolutions to the conflict. This outside analyst will know whether each DM is aware of some 
states that no other DM knows about, will employ appropriate solution concepts in the 
analysis, and will consolidate the conclusions of different stability analyses across all 
perceptual graph models to predict possible resolutions. The underlying structure of 
perceptual stability analysis is an expansion of the standard stability analysis, and is 
comprised of the two-phase approach shown in Figure 6.3.  In Phase 1, each perceptual graph 
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is analyzed using appropriate solution concepts from the point of view of the DM who owns 
it, for each DM in the conflict model. Analyzing a perceptual graph is equivalent to treating 
the DM who owns it as the analyst, but the conclusions drawn by that analyst from applying 




Figure 6.3: Perceptual stability analysis. 
 
The form appropriate for solution concepts in perceptual stability analysis is determined by 
each DM’s index of awareness. On one hand, for example, if DM k is aware that the other 
DMs recognize only partial views in ,kG  i.e., 1,kα =  then k iG G⊇  for all i N k∈ −  and 
perceptual solution concepts (to be defined later) must be used to analyze k’s model.  If DM 
k, on the other hand, is unaware of the presence of different graph models to the conflict, i.e.,  
0,kα =  then k believes that k iG G=  for all i N k∈ −  and standard solution concepts 
(defined in Chapter 2) must be used to analyze k’s model. 
In a 2-DM model, let DM i refer to the focal DM who seizes the initiative and moves the 
conflict to another state, and let i’s opponent be DM j. For example, when ,k i=  DM i 
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analyzes the stability of states in iG  under a particular solution concept twice: first, when i  
is the focal DM while j is the opponent, and second, when j is the focal DM while i is the 
opponent. The outcomes of DM i’s stability analysis represent i’s  perception of overall and 
private stabilities of the states in .iG  Similarly, when ,k j=  DM j analyzes the stability of 
the states in jG for DMs  i  and  j.  
In a perceptual graph system, a state that is recognized and stable for all DMs is called 
overall stable, and is a predicted resolution of the conflict. It is possible for a state to be 
recognized by some but not all DMs and to be stable for all DMs who recognize it; this 
means that the state is  pseudo-equilibrium.   
In Phase 2 of Figure 6.3, meta-stability is defined for a graph model system, across all 
variants of awareness, to predict resolutions using private and overall stabilities. Meta-
stability analysis is not performed by any of the DMs but rather by an insightful, outside 
analyst who is aware of incompatibilities in the DMs’ models of the conflict. Perceptual 
graph modeling reflects DMs’ perceptions and awareness in the conflict, while perceptual 
stability analysis permits the exploration of the behavioral consequences of these perceptual 
differences and leads to insightful conclusions about likely resolutions that reflect 




6.4 Perceptual Solution Concepts—The 2-Decision 
Maker Case 
Perceptual solution concepts for Nash stability, general and symmetric metarationality, and 
sequential stability are now formulated for the case of perceptual graph models with two 
DMs. These formulations allow an informed DM to apply appropriate rules that take into 
account that DM’s awareness of the opponent’s limited perception. Therefore, perceptual 
solution concepts are employed whenever the owner of a perceptual graph model has an 
index of awareness equal to one. 
As mentioned above, k refers to the DM who owns the perceptual graph model, and 
either k i= or k j=  but not both. For simplicity, assume that {1, 2}.N =  Hence, if 1i =  
then 2j = ,  and if 2i =  then 1.j =  Furthermore, in perceptual solution concepts, DM k is 
interested in analyzing states that he or she knows are perceived by the focal DM i,  i.e. 
.k is S S∈ ¡ û   
Every perceptual graph in the system 1 2( , )G G  is a sub-graph that shares some qualities 
with the standard graph model. Two important features of standard stability analysis are 
preserved in perceptual stability analysis. First, at any state ,s  DM i  can identify two subsets 
within :S  ( ) { : }i m m is s s s
+Φ =  is the set of all states that DM i prefers to ,s  and 
( ) { : }ii m ms s s s
≤Φ = ≺   is the set of all states that DM i  finds equally or less preferred to .s  
Second, DM i’s  reachable list  ( )iR s  from state s  is the set of all states that can be reached 
by DM i  in one step from state .s  The concept of unilateral improvement is based upon 
these two features. A unilateral improvement (UI) from a particular state for a specific DM is 
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a preferred state for that DM to which he or she can unilaterally move in one step. Therefore, 
( )iR s  can be divided into two sets:  ( ) ( ) ( )i i iR s R s s
+ += Φ∩  represents the set of all unilateral 
improvements from state s for DM i, and ( ) ( ) ( )i i iR s R s s
≤ ≤= Φ∩  represents the set of all 
unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i, where moving to an equally preferred 
state is considered to be a disimprovement since nothing is gained. 
 
6.4.1 Perceived Default Stability 
The analysis of a perceptual graph model ,kG  which is done from the point of view of DM k  
(the owner), must first distinguish between two kinds of stability of a state for a focal DM: 1) 
the state is stable because the DM cannot unilaterally move away from it, and 2) the state is 
stable because, although the DM can move away from it, the DM has no incentive to do so.  
The former stability is described as stability by default. 
 
Definition 6.4.1.a: Perceived default stability 
For i N∈ and k i= or ,k j=  a state k is S S∈ ∩  is perceived by k to be default stable  for 
DM i  if and only if  (iff) there exists no unilateral move from  s  for i, i.e., ( ) .i kR s S =∅∩  
 
Default stability describes the situation where the focal DM i has no option but to accept the 
current state because there exists no adjacent state that i can move to. Note that DM k 
assesses the reachable list, ( )iR s ,  for the focal DM i that is located in .kS   A special case 
occurs when DM k is aware of some adjacent states that are invisible to focal DM i.  Hence, k 
knows that the current state appears to be default stable for DM i, although in reality it is not. 
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Definition 6.4.1.b: Apparent default stability 
For ,i N∈  a state Cs S∈  is perceived by j to be an apparently default stable for DM i  iff all 
unilateral moves away from s are inconspicuous to i, i.e., ( ) CiR s S =∅∩  and 
( ) .Pi jR s S ≠ ∅∩  
 
Apparent default stability reflects the limited perception of a focal DM; all states reachable 
from the current state are in j’s  privately perceived set of states, .PjS   If the focal DM were 
to become aware of these adjacent states, the current state would be assessed for stability 
under other solution concepts. 
 
6.4.2 Perceived Nash Stability 
Nash stability describes a rational (though shortsighted) DM who makes choices conducive 
to his or her best interest. According to Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 50): “of two alternatives 
which give rise to states, a player will choose the one which yields the more preferred state.”  
A reformulated Nash stability definition must take into account a DM’s inability to recognize 
the more preferred state. Let NashikS denote the set of states in kS that are perceived to be Nash 
stable for focal DM i. 
 
Definition 6.4.2.a: Perceived Nash stability 
For i N∈ and k i= or ,k j=  a state k is S S∈ ∩  is perceived by k to be Nash stable for DM 
i, denoted by Nash ,iks S∈  iff   ( )i k iR s S S ≠ ∅∩ ∩  and  ( ) .i kR s S




In this definition, DM k investigates UIs (i.e., ( )iR s
+ ) for the focal DM i that are located in 
k’s perceptual graph model. DM k  perceives a state to be Nash stable for the focal DM i  
whenever k  believes that there is no preferred state in kS that i can move to; without regard 
to any possible countermoves by the opponent.  Note that  ( )i kR s S ≠ ∅∩  is implied by 
( ) ,i k iR s S S ≠ ∅∩ ∩  so state s is neither perceived default nor apparently default stable, 
while the condition ( )i kR s S
+ = ∅∩  ensures that there are no UIs for the focal DM i  in .kS   
As a special case, a state that is not Nash stable in the standard graph model may be 
apparently Nash stable in the opponent’s perceptual graph model if all the UIs are located in 
the opponent’s privately perceived set of states. Once the focal DM becomes aware of these 
UIs, the state no longer remains Nash stable. Let ANashijS denote the set of states in jS that are 
perceived to be apparently Nash stable for focal DM i. 
 
Definition 6.4.2.b: Apparent Nash stability 
For ,i N∈  a state Cs S∈  is perceived by j to be apparently Nash stable for DM i, denoted 
by ANash ,ijs S∈  iff  ( )
C
iR s S ≠ ∅∩  and ( ) ,
C
iR s S
+ = ∅∩  but ( ) .Pi jR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  
 
Although DM i can move unilaterally from the current state, all UIs are apprehended by DM 
j  but not by the focal DM i whose perception is limited. Note that apparent Nash stability 
does not apply to the focal DM who owns the graph model, i.e., ,k i=  since DM i’s 
awareness would be equal to DM k’s. Therefore, apparent stability applies only for a focal 
DM with limited perception. 
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The definitions of GMR, SEQ, and SMR stabilities require the presence of some UIs 
from current state. Therefore, a state that is Nash stable or apparently Nash stable for a DM 
is, by definition, GMR, SEQ, and SMR stable (see below). 
 
6.4.3 Perceived General Metarationality Stability 
Howard (1971) modeled the behavior of a cautious DM who is tempted to move to a more 
preferred state but considers all possible damaging reactions by the opponent (sanctions). 
The DM contemplates exactly two steps ahead and does not think of escaping any sanctions.  
Let GMR ikS denote the set of states in kS  that are perceived to be apparently GMR stable for 
focal DM i. 
 
Definition 6.4.3.a: Perceived General Metarationality 
For  ,i j N∈ and k i= or ,k j=  a state iks S S∈ ∩  is perceived by k to be GMR stable for 
DM i, denoted by GMR ,iks S∈  iff  ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and for every ( ) Cit R s S
+∈ ∩  there exists 
( ) ( ) .Cj iR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
 
Thus, DM k  perceives a state to be GMR stable for the focal DM i  whenever k  believes that 
if  i  takes advantage of any available UI,  DM j can sanction this UI (i.e., ( ) ( )j iR t s
≤Φ∩ ) 
and will do so irrespective of whether it is in j’s interest to do so. In Definition 6.4.3.a., the 
set of states common to both the focal DM and the opponent must be perceived by the owner 
of the perceptual graph model. For example, setting ,k i=  a simplified form of perceived 
GMR stability is obtained: For , ,i j N∈  a state is S∈  is perceived by i to be GMR stable 
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for DM i, denoted by GMR ,iis S∈ iff ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩ and for every ( ) CiR st S+∈ ∩  there exists 
( ) ( ) .Cj iR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
To assess perceived GMR stability, DM k investigates UIs and sanctions in kG that are 
recognized by both the focal DM and his or her opponent (if ,k i=  it is not necessary that 
the state s be recognized by the opponent). Consequently, a GMR stable state for a focal DM 
in a standard graph model will be stable in a perceptual graph model for that DM if and only 
if all UIs and, for each UI, some possible sanction belongs to the set of states common to the 
DMs.   
Moreover, depending on who owns the perceptual graph model (i.e., k i= or )k j= , a 
GMR stable state for a focal DM in a standard graph may be perceived as GMR unstable in 
the perceptual graph model for the focal DM. Specifically, if k i=  and DM i  has a UI that 
is privately perceived  by i  (i.e., PiS ), or the UI is commonly visible to both DMs but every 
sanction by DM j belongs to PiS , then the state must be perceived as GMR strategic 
advantage unstable for DM i.  Consequently, the focal DM i  may take advantage of the UI, 
which would not be the case in the standard graph model under the GMR solution concept. 
On the other hand, if  k j=  and a sanction for DM i’s UI is not recognized by i  (i.e., a UI 
belongs to PjS ), then the focal state must be perceived by DM j to be GMR strategic 
disadvantage unstable for DM i.  The focal DM i may take advantage of the available UI, 
unaware of the opponent’s inconspicuous sanction. Formally, the two strategic instabilities 





Definition 6.4.3.b: GMR strategic advantage instability 
For , ,i j N∈  a state is S∈  is perceived by i to be GMR strategic advantage unstable for 
DM i, denoted by GSAUN ,iis S∈  iff ( )
P
i iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  or ( ) CiR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and there exists 
( ) Cit R s S
+∈ ∩ such that  ( ) ( ) Cj iR t s S
≤Φ =∅∩ ∩  but ( ) ( ) .Pj i iR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
 
In definition 6.4.3.b, GSAUNiiS  denotes the set of states in iS that are perceived to be GMR 
strategic advantage unstable for focal DM i. Strategic advantage instability reflects the 
opponent’s limited perception of the focal DM’s UIs or the sanctions to a UI. If the focal DM 
i  takes advantage of an available UI, the opponent will discover some of the hidden states; a 
new graph model that takes into account this disclosure will become necessary.   
 
Definition 6.4.3.c: GMR strategic disadvantage instability 
For , ,i j N∈  a state Cs S∈  is perceived by j to be GMR strategic disadvantage unstable for 
DM i, denoted by GSDUN ,ijs S∈  iff ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩ and there exists ( ) Cit R s S
+∈ ∩  such that 
( ) ( ) Cj iR t s S
≤Φ =∅∩ ∩  but ( ) ( ) .Pj i jR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
 
In definition 6.4.3.c, GSDUNijS denotes the set of states in jS  that are perceived to be GMR 
strategic disadvantage unstable for focal DM i. Strategic disadvantage instability is 
“blindsided” GMR stability, ultimately caused by the focal DM’s lack of perception of the 
opponent’s sanction. Thus, in ,jG  DM j has sanctions to some of DM i’s UIs that are 
inconspicuous to DM i.   
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A state that is stable in a standard graph model for a DM may become strategically 
unstable for the DM in a graph model system in either DMs’ perception. A state that is 
strategically unstable highlights the value of knowledge in a graph model system and gives 
the DM with the knowledge an edge over the opponent. 
 
6.4.4 Perceived Sequential Stability 
Fraser and Hipel (1984) modified Howard’s (1971) general metarationality definition to 
define sequential stability (SEQ) by considering only sanctions that are unilateral 
improvements for the sanctioner (called “credible sanctions”). Similar to GMR, in SEQ 
stability a DM contemplates exactly two steps ahead and does not ask whether sanctions can 
be circumvented. Let SEQikS denote the set of states in kS  that are perceived to be SEQ stable 
for focal DM i.   
 
Definition 6.4.4.a: Perceived sequential stability 
For  ,i j N∈ and k i= or ,k j=   a state k is S S∈ ∩  is perceived by k to be SEQ stable for 
DM i, denoted by SEQ ,iks S∈  iff  ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and for every ( ) Cit R s S
+∈ ∩  there exists 
( ) ( ) .Cj iR t s S
+ ≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
 
Thus, DM k  perceives a state to be SEQ stable for the focal DM i  when k believes that, if i 
takes advantage of any possible UI, DM j has a credible sanction (i.e., a state in 
( ) ( )j iR t s
+ ≤Φ∩ ).  DM k investigates UIs and credible sanctions that are recognized by both 
the focal DM and his or her opponent in kG  (if ,k i= it is not necessary that the state s be 
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recognized by the opponent). Consequently, a SEQ stable state for a focal DM in a standard 
graph model will be stable in a perceptual graph model for that DM if and only if all the UIs 
and some possible credible sanctions belong to the set of states common to the DMs. For 
example, setting ,k j=  a simplified form of perceived SEQ stability is obtained: For 
,i N∈  a state Cs S∈ is perceived by j to be SEQ stable for DM i, denoted by SEQ ,ijs S∈  iff  
( ) CiR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and for every  ( ) CiR st S+∈ ∩  there exists ( ) ( ) .
C
j iR t s S
+ ≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩   
Since the underlying rules in SEQ and GMR stabilities are similar, the definitions of 
GMR strategic advantage unstable and GMR strategic disadvantage unstable can be extended 
readily to SEQ stability. 
 
Definition 6.4.4.b: SEQ strategic advantage instability 
For , ,i j N∈   a state is S∈  is perceived by i to be  SEQ strategic advantage unstable for 
DM i, denoted by QSAUN ,iis S∈ iff  ( )
P
i iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  or ( ) CiR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and there exists 
( ) Cit R s S
+∈ ∩  such that  ( ) ( ) Cj iR t s S
+ ≤Φ =∅∩ ∩  but ( ) ( ) .Pj i iR t s S
+ ≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩    
 
In definition 6.4.4.b, QSAUNiiS  denotes the set of states in iS that are perceived to be SEQ 
strategic advantage unstable for focal DM i. Thus, a state is perceived by focal DM i to be 
SEQ SAUN if  i  has a UI that is privately perceived, or the UI is commonly perceived by 
both DMs but every credible sanction by the opponent j belongs to .PiS  Notice that by 
definition if a state has a privately perceived UI, the state is both GMR and SMR strategic 




Definition 6.4.4.c: SEQ strategic disadvantage instability 
For , ,i j N∈  a state Cs S∈  is perceived by j to be SEQ strategic disadvantage unstable for 
DM i, denoted by QSDUN ,ijs S∈  iff ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and there exists ( ) Cit R s S
+∈ ∩  such that 
( ) ( ) Cj iR t s S
+ ≤Φ =∅∩ ∩  but ( ) ( ) .Pj i jR t s S
+ ≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
 
In definition 6.4.4.c, QSDUNijS  denotes the set of states in jS that are perceived to be SEQ 
strategic disadvantage unstable for focal DM i.  A state must be perceived by DM j to be 
SEQ strategic disadvantage unstable for focal DM i if j has a credible sanction for i’s UI in 
.PjS  
 
6.4.5 Perceived Symmetric Metarationality Stability 
Howard (1971) extended general metarationality to symmetric metarationality (SMR). Under 
SMR stability, a focal DM considers not only the initial improvement (UI) and the sanctions 
by the opponent, but also his or her possible escape from such sanctions. A state that is GMR 
stable will be assessed for SMR stability. Therefore, a DM contemplates exactly three steps 
ahead, including escaping from any sanction that may be imposed by the opponent. Let 
SMRi
kS  denote the set of states in kS that are perceived to be SMR stable for focal DM i.  
 
Definition 6.4.5.a: Perceived symmetric metarationality 
For ,i j N∈ and k i= or ,k j=  a state k is S S∈ ∩  is perceived by k to be SMR stable for 
DM i, denoted by SMR ,iks S∈ iff ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and for every ( ) ,Cit R s S
+∈ ∩  
( ) ( ) ,Cj iR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  and for all ( ) ( ) ,Cj ih R t s S
≤∈ Φ∩ ∩  ( ) ( ) .i i kR h s S
+Φ =∅∩ ∩  
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Thus, DM k perceives a state to be SMR stable for the focal DM i  whenever k believes that 
if i takes advantage of any possible UI, DM j has an inescapable sanction.  An inescapable 
sanction is a sanction from which the focal DM has no counter-response to move to a state 
that is preferable to the original state.  Note that SMR stability is a strengthening of GMR 
stability. However, it is necessary that all escapes be recognized by DM k. For example, 
setting ,k j=  a simplified form of perceived SMR stability definition is obtained: For 
, ,i j N∈  a state Cs S∈ is perceived by j to be SMR stable for DM i, denoted by SMR ,iis S∈  
iff  ( ) CiR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and for every ( ) ,Cit R s S
+∈ ¡ û ( ) ( ) ,Cj iR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  and for all 
( ) ( ) ,Cj ih R t s S
≤∈ Φ∩ ∩  ( ) ( ) .i i jR h s S
+Φ =∅∩ ∩  
A state that is not SMR stable for the focal DM in the standard graph model may be 
apparently SMR stable in the opponent’s perceptual graph model if all escapes to sanctions 
are located in the opponent’s privately perceived set of states. Once the focal DM becomes 
aware of these escapes, the state no longer remains SMR stable. 
 
Definition 6.4.5.b: Apparent symmetric metarationality stability 
For , ,i j N∈  a state Cs S∈  is perceived by j to be apparently SMR stable for DM i, denoted 
by ASMR ,ijs S∈ iff ( )
C
iR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  and for every ( ) ,Cit R s S
+∈ ∩ ( ) ( ) ,Cj iR t s S
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
and for all  ( ) ( ) ,Cj ih R t s S
≤∈ Φ∩ ∩  ( ) ( ) Ci iR h s S
≤Φ =∅∩ ∩  but ( ) ( ) .Pi i jR h s S
+Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  
 
In definition 6.4.5.b, ASMR ijS denotes the set of states in jS that are perceived to be apparently 
SMR stable for focal DM i. According to this definition, all escapes are apprehended by DM 
j but not by the focal DM i with limited perception. Similar to apparent Nash stability, 
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apparent SMR does not apply for the focal DM who owns the graph model. Therefore, 
apparent SMR stability must be only used for a focal DM with limited perception. For 
example, setting ,k i= the apparently SMR stability definition does not apply since DM i is 
endowed with awareness. 
 
6.5 Meta-Stability Analysis 
6.5.1 Variants of Awareness 
Meta-stability analysis is performed by an analyst, who is aware of the inconsistencies in the 
DMs’ perceptions, and can analyze each perceptual graph model in a graph model system 
from the point of view of its owner. In a graph model system, different DMs generally have 
different comprehensions of the same conflict, albeit they may agree on some features. So it 
becomes important to keep track of which perceptual graph model is being analyzed and 
what each DM knows. Consequently, a perceptual graph model expresses each DM’s 
perception of the conflict, and each DM’s viewpoint, which reflects the awareness of states 
that are inconspicuous to other DMs. 
A graph model system, therefore, includes a viewpoint for every DM. A viewpoint is the 
perspective used by a DM in viewing and analyzing the conflict and it reflects the DM’s 
awareness of other DMs’ perceptions.  DM k’s viewpoint marks those states in kG which are 
shared with other DMs, and it partitions k’s set of recognized states kS according to 
recognition by the opponents. Hence, if 0kα = , DM k’s viewpoint is kS  such that 
k
k iS S=  
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for all ;i N∈  whereas if 1,kα =  DM k’s viewpoint is 
C P
kS S∩  such that 
k
k iS S⊇  for all 
.i N∈  
Consolidating individual stability analysis in a graph model system requires considering 
all combinations of each DM’s two possible viewpoints. In a 2-DM model, the set of ordered 
combinations of DMs’ viewpoints defines the variant of awareness, ( , ),i jα α  which 
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Figure 6.4: Variants of awareness for a 2-decision maker conflict. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows a system of two perceptual graph models for each variant of awareness. 
The owner of each perceptual graph model in the first-variant of awareness, ( , ) (1,1),i jα α =  
is aware of the states that are inconspicuous to the other DM.  From DM i’s viewpoint, the 
dashed-line encloses the subset in jS  that is not perceived by i, who recognizes the grey 
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rectangle ,iS  and can distinguish the privately perceived states, in ,
P
iS  from the commonly 
perceived states, in .CS  
Similarly, from DM j’s viewpoint, the dashed-line signifies the subset of iS that is not 
perceived by DM j, who can distinguish the privately perceived states, in ,PjS  from the 
commonly perceived states, in .CS   Only one of the owners in the second and third -variants 
is aware of states in his or her own perceptual graph model that are invisible to the other DM. 
In the fourth-variant, both DMs are unaware that they are viewing different graph models.  
On the other hand, the real analyst is aware of all sets and subsets of perceptual graph 
models, regardless of the variant of awareness. 
 
6.5.2 Applying Perceptual Stability Analyses 
A DM’s viewpoint specifies the set of recognized states, and indicates whether the DM can 
distinguish commonly from privately perceived states. An informed DM is able to recognize 
privately and commonly perceived states in his or her perceptual graph model, while an 
unaware DM believes there is only one standard graph model and does not recognize that 
some states are not perceived by the opponent.  
Whatever the variant of awareness, perceptual stability analyses are applied to a graph 
model system by examining the stability of perceived states for all DMs in every perceptual 
graph, from the viewpoint of the DM who owns it. The appropriate form of each solution 
concept depends on the DM’s awareness. In a 2-DM model, when k i= analyzes iG  from 
i’s viewpoint, standard solution concepts should be used if 0iα =  and perceptual solution 
concepts should be used if 1.iα =  Similarly, for .k j=    
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Table 6.1 illustrates how perceptual stability analyses are applied for a 2-DM model.  No 
analysis is performed in the cells labeled “A” because the owner of the perceptual graph 
model does not recognize the set of states privately perceived by the other DM.  For example, 
in DM i’s perceptual graph model, i does not recognize the set .PjS   Furthermore, the cells 
labeled “B” or “C” indicate that the owner of a perceptual graph model is aware that his or 
her privately perceived states are not recognized by the other DM, and therefore no analysis 
is performed on these states for that DM.  For example, if 1,iα =   DM i  knows that DM j  
does not recognize states in .PiS   DM i, therefore, will not analyze any state in 
P
iS for focal 
DM  j. Similarly, if 1,jα =  DM j  will not analyze states in 
P

















Table 6.1: Template for a 2-DM Model Perceptual Stability Analysis 
( , )i jα α   k i=  k j=  
[ , 1]i iG α =  [ , 1]j jG α =  
Focal DM i Focal DM j Focal DM 1 Focal DM2  
Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ 
CS [Analyze using  perceptual solution concepts] 
[Analyze using  
perceptual solution concepts] 
P
iS  





















[ , 1]i iG α =  [ , 0]j jG α =  
Focal DM i Focal DM j Focal DM i Focal DM j  
Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ 
CS  [Analyze using  perceptual solution concepts] 
  
[Analyze using  
standard solution concepts] 
P
iS  















[Analyze using  
standard solution 
concepts] 
[ , 0]i iG α =  { , 1]j jG α =  
Focal DM i Focal DM j Focal DM i Focal DM j  
Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ 
CS  [Analyze using  standard solution concepts] 
[Analyze using  
perceptual solution concepts] 
P
iS  


















[ , 0]i iG α =  [ , 0]j jG α =  
Focal DM i Focal DM j Focal DM i Focal DM j  
Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ Nash GMR SMR SEQ 
CS  [Analyze using  standard solution concepts] 
[Analyze using  
standard solution concepts] 
P
iS  












[Analyze using  





6.5.3 Overall and Private Stabilities 
It must be emphasized that the outcomes of perceptual stability analysis depend on the 
awareness of the owner of the graph model and the location of the assessed state for stability. 
Figure 6.5 shows the different outcomes that can be obtained under a particular solution 
concept in analyzing DM k’s perceptual graph model. A state that is recognized by DM k and 
stable for all DMs is an overall stable state from the viewpoint of DM k.  Formally: 
 
Definition 6.5.3.a: Overall stability 
A state ks S∈  is overall stable for DM k N∈  under a particular solution concept  iff  s  is 










Figure 6.5: The outcomes of perceptual stability analysis. 
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Equilibrium and overall stability are synonyms in a standard graph model as they both refer 
to a state that is stable for all DMs under a particular solution concept. No assumptions are 
made yet about the visibility of the state to any DM in k’s perceptual graph model. But, as 
shown in Figure 6.5, if 1,kα =  then state s is overall stable in kG if it belongs to the set of 
commonly perceived states, i.e, ,Cs S∈  and s is stable for both DMs, while if 0,kα =  there 
is no restriction on the location of state s in .kG   On the other hand, if DM k is aware that a 
state in kS is not recognized by other DMs and the state is stable for focal DM k only, then it 
is described as being privately stable for k. Formally: 
 
Definition 6.5.3.b: Private stability 
A state ks S∈  is privately stable for DM k N∈ under a particular solution concept  iff  
1,kα =  
P
ks S∈  and s  is stable for k under that solution concept. 
 
6.5.4 Meta-stability Analysis Technique 
Perceptual stability analysis requires examining the stability of a state in all graph models. 
Nonetheless, overall (or private) stability in a DM’s perceptual graph model under a 
particular solution concept is not sufficient to qualify the state to be an equilibrium under that 
solution concept, and thereby is not a predicted resolution to conflict. Hence, new definitions 
suitable to incompatibilities in DMs’ perceptions and viewpoints and capable of providing 
important insights into the robustness of stability and the sustainability of particular 
resolutions must be introduced. 
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An equilibrium has to be determined by consolidating each of the DMs’ stability analysis 
conclusions, and indicates a common belief among all DMs of a commensurable, predictable 
resolution. An outside analyst, therefore, must employ meta-stability analysis on all states 
that are perceived to be stable in a perceptual graph system.  Meta-stability is determined by 
first, examining the stability of states across all graphs in a perceptual graph model system 
and, second, examining equilibrium states across all variants of awareness. 
To begin with, an equilibrium as a predicted resolution to conflict should take into 
account both the perceptibility and stability of a state. Consequently, a state must be 
recognized and be overall stable from the point of view of each DM in order to be an 
equilibrium.  Formally: 
 
Definition 6.5.4.a: Equilibrium 
A state s S∈  is an equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff  for every ,i N∈  
is S∈  and  s  is overall stable for DM i under that solution concept. 
 
For a state to be an equilibrium, it must belong to the set of commonly perceived states CS  
and be overall stable in every perceptual graph model. Accordingly, a state that is recognized 
by all DMs in a perceptual graph system but not overall stable in at least one perceptual 
graph model is not an equilibrium. On the other hand, if a state is not recognized by all DMs, 







Definition 6.5.4.b: Pseudo-equilibrium 
A state s S∈  is a pseudo-equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff  s is overall 
stable for every DM i such that is S∈  for some but not all .i N∈   
 
For instance in a 2-DM model, if a state is recognized and overall stable in DM 1’s 
perceptual graph model and is not recognized by DM 2, then the state is a pseudo-
equilibrium. A pseudo-equilibrium state is an illusionary equilibrium in that some DMs 
recognize it and find it overall stable, but it is unsustainable because some DMs do not 
perceive it as a possible outcome.  However, if the DMs who recognize a pseudo-equilibrium 
state attain and choose to stay at it, it will become a status quo, and thereby will become 
recognizable to all DMs and part of all perceptual graph models. Presumably, a new model, 
and new perceptual stability and meta-stability analyses will be appropriate at this point. 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a pseudo-equilibrium will be stable at least in the short 
term, until all DMs adjust their models to account for it, and may be stable in the long term 
depending on those adjusted models. 
DM k’s awareness that other DMs do not perceive some states in k’s perceptual graph 
model qualifies states that are privately perceived to be stable by k as private equilibria. 
Therefore, a state s S∈  is a private equilibrium for k N∈ under a particular solution 
concept iff Pks S∈ and s is privately stable for DM k under that solution concept. 
Accordingly, a private equilibrium is a special case of pseudo-equilibrium, occurring when a 
DM is aware that other DMs have different perceptual graph models for a conflict. A private 
equilibrium results from others’ limited perceptions while pseudo-equilibrium results from 
all DMs’ limited perceptions—the former reflects awareness while the latter does not. 
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Since an outside analyst may be interested in comparing the consequences of different 
variants of awareness, it is necessary to gauge the sustainability of any resolution in a graph 
model system. The sustainability of a resolution is an assessment of the robustness of 
perceptual stability analysis to changes in each DM’s awareness of other DMs’ models.  The 
next step in meta-stability analysis, therefore, is to examine the equilibrium of states across 
all variants of awareness. Figure 6.6 shows the overall stability of a state, under a particular 










In all variants of 
awareness
In some but not all 
variants of awareness  
Figure 6.6: Properties of equilibrium as a function of perceptual graphs and 
variants of awareness. 
 
The equilibrium (or pseudo-equilibrium) of a state under a particular solution concept can be 
either solid or transitory, depending on whether the state is consistently an equilibrium in all, 
or only some, variants of awareness. A state that is a solid equilibrium across all variants of 
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awareness is a credible predicted resolution, independent of every DM’s awareness. The 
persistence of an equilibrium across all variants of awareness imbues it with credibility and 
sustainability as a potential resolution to the conflict, once it is attained. In a 2-DM model, a 
state that is an equilibrium across the four variants of awareness in a perceptual graph system 
is a solid equilibrium. Formally: 
 
Definition 6.5.4.c: Solid equilibrium 
A state s S∈  is a solid equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff  s  is an 
equilibrium in all variants of awareness in a perceptual graph system. 
  
Likewise, a state that is a pseudo-equilibrium across all variants of awareness is a solid 
pseudo-equilibrium state, which means that the state is overall stable in some but not all 
perceptual graph models, independent of the DM’s index of awareness, and not recognized 
by the other DMs. On the other hand, an equilibrium (or pseudo-equilibrium) may prevail in 
some but not all variants of awareness. Whether the state qualifies as a predicted resolution 
should it be attained depends on the awareness of the DMs. Formally: 
 
Definition 6.5.4.d: Transitory equilibrium 
A state s S∈  is a transitory equilibrium under a particular solution concept iff s  is an 
equilibrium in some but not all variants of awareness.   
 
In a 2-DM model, a state that is an equilibrium in some but not all variants of awareness and 
is overall stable in other variants for only one of the DMs is a transitory equilibrium. In other 
words, the state is a predicted resolution because it is overall stable in some variants of 
 
  115
awareness for all DMs but is not a predicted resolution in other variants of awareness, 
because it is perceived and overall stable in only some of the graph models. 
A state that is a pseudo-equilibrium in some but not all variants of awareness is a 
transitory pseudo-equilibrium state. Formally: 
 
Definition 6.5.4.e: Transitory pseudo-equilibrium 
A state s S∈  is a transitory pseudo-equilibrium iff  s is pseudo-equilibrium across some but 
not all variants of awareness. 
 
If the equilibrium of a state is conditional on some DM’s awareness, the equilibrium is 
precarious, and the analyst should seek further information about that awareness before 
making a prediction. Furthermore, if a transitory equilibrium or pseudo-equilibrium state is a 
desired outcome, one must employ appropriate strategies to ensure that the state is perceived 
by all DMs to make it a solid equilibrium. 
The 1990s confrontation in Chechnya between Russia and Chechen Rebels, an emotion-
laden struggle with inconsistent perceptions, is used to illustrate perceptual stability analysis 
approach. 
 
6.6 The Chechnya Conflict 
For almost two centuries since the expansion of the Tsarist Empire through the Caucasus 
region, the Chechens have fought fiercely for their independence, and have suffered a great 
deal as a consequence. One of the greatest atrocities was the mass deportation of the Chechen 
and Ingush people to Kazakhstan and Siberia ordered by Stalin in 1944, apparently caused by 
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his suspicion that they were collaborating with Nazi Germany (Eide, 2001). With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechnya’s former leader, 
declared the unilateral independence of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. When the 
Russian army invaded Chechnya in 1994, its stated objective was to bring civil obedience 
and order to this autonomous Russian Republic (Sirén, 1998). To Moscow’s surprise, a long 
and brutal war ensued. The Chechen fighters fought the Russian army to a draw, and in 1996 
both sides agreed to postpone a decision about Chechnya’s status until 2001. In December 
1996, Russian forces were withdrawn from Chechnya. 
Chechen leaders behaved as if the peace agreement with Moscow endowed them with a 
de facto legitimacy. They called an election in 1997, and Aslan Maskhodov was declared the 
first President of Chechnya. However, Maskhadov’s uneasy alliance with Chechen radical 
leaders Shamil Basaev and Amir Khattab undermined his authority and encouraged Islamic 
militants from Afghanistan and central Asia to enter Chechnya. Maskhodov’s authority 
weakened, and in February 1999 he was forced to adopt Sharia law (Evangelista, 2002). Six 
months later, purportedly to establish an Islamic state, Chechen extremists who followed 
Basaev and Khattab invaded the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan, unleashing a 
wave of terror in Chechnya, Dagestan, and elsewhere. Maskhadov’s reluctance to capture 
Basaev and Khattab, destroy rebel bases in the mountains, and send Chechen troops to 
Dagestan angered the Russian government, which accused him of harboring militants, 
including the terrorists responsible for explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow 
(Evangelista, 2002).  In September 1999, Russia officially launched a second military 
campaign to establish a “security zone” in Chechnya, terminating all diplomatic contacts 
with Maskhadov.  Since then, there have been thousands of civilian casualties on both sides; 
 
  117
terrorism has continued in Russian cities; and Russian armies have been accused of brutal 
and indiscriminate killings to root out rebels from villages. After the terrorist attacks on the 
United States in 2001, the Russian government justified its campaign in Chechnya as part of 
the global war against terrorism (Demitri and Malashenko, 2004). 
To supplant Maskhadov, a pro-Russian government headed by Akhmad Kadyrov was 
established in Grozny. In March 2003, Chechens voted by referendum to abandon complete 
independence in favor of maintaining Chechnya as an autonomous republic within Russia. In 
return, they expected peace. However, suicide bombings and terrorism continue, including 
the 2004 attack on a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, in which hundreds of children were 
killed. 
 
6.6.1 The Standard Graph Model for the Chechnya Conflict 
To illustrate the analysis, the focus will be on a simplified version of the conflict in 
Chechnya, with only two DMs: Russia and Chechen Rebels (who encompass Chechen 
separatists and extremists). As of January 2005, Russia has two options: fight the Chechen 
Rebels brutally, by the bombing of Chechen villages from the air and invading on the 
ground; and negotiate with them. The Chechen Rebels have three options: fight the Russian 
army; engage in direct negotiations that will eventually achieve a modus vivendi for both 
parties; and terrorize civilians inside Russia to demoralize the public. Table 6.2 illustrates the 






Table 6.2: Decision Makers and Options in the Chechnya Conflict 
Decision Makers Options Status Quo  
Russia 1. Fight the Chechen rebels Y 
 2. Negotiate with Chechen rebels N Russia’s strategy 
Chechen Rebels 3. Fight the Russian army Y 
 3. Negotiate with Moscow N 





In Table 6.2, the status quo state represents an outcome in which Russia fights (as indicated 
by the Y opposite option 1) and Chechen Rebels fight and terrorize (options 3 and 5), and 
neither side negotiates (as indicated by the N beside options 2 and 4). Since an option can be 
taken or not, in this conflict model there are 32 (25) mathematically possible states. But some 
option combinations are infeasible because they require mutually exclusive options (e.g., 
Russia cannot both fight and negotiate; and Chechen Rebels cannot both negotiate and 
terrorize) or because of option dependence (e.g., if Chechen Rebels fight or terrorize, Russia 
will retaliate; and if Russia accepts a de facto independence, the Chechen Rebels will not 
choose negotiate). Table 6.3 shows the DMs with their feasible states, 










Table 6.3: Feasible States in the Chechnya Conflict 
  States 
Decision Makers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Russia             
1. Fight  N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
2. Negotiate  N N Y N N Y N N Y N N N 
Chechen Rebels             
3. Fight N N N Y N N Y N N Y N Y 
4. Negotiate  N N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y 
5. Terrorize N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
  
 
In this model, preferences over the feasible states were ascertained from the political and 
historical context of the conflict, and are expressed by a complete preference ordering of the 
states for each DM. The Russian government does not want to follow the path of the Soviet 
Union and disintegrate into its constituent parts. Therefore, defeating the Chechen Rebels 
takes high priority, and succumbing to Chechen Rebels’ terror is least preferred, since it 
might encourage rebellions elsewhere. Russia’s preferences are expressed in the state 
ordering (most to least preferred)  <2, 5, 7, 4, 6, 1, 3, 9, 8, 10, 11, 12>.  The Chechen Rebels 
want Russia to withdraw from Chechnya and negotiate an agreement giving them 
independence from the Russian Federation. Their preference ranking is <6, (1, 3), 9, (7, 11, 
12), (4, 8, 10), (2, 5)>, where equally preferred states are enclosed in brackets. 
For a later comparison, stability analysis of the standard graph model is shown in Table 
6.4. A forward slash in a cell indicates that the state is not assessed for stability under a 
solution concept listed in the third column. For example, state 4 is stable by default for 
Russia, and therefore is not assessed for stability under the remaining solution concepts. The 
analysis reveals that states 7, 11, and 12 are equilibria for all solution concepts, where Russia 
fights and Chechen Rebels retaliate violently, albeit sometimes they accept negotiation as 
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they implement a terror strategy. States 1, 6, and 9 are GMR, SMR, and SEQ equilibria. 
States 1 and 2 are peaceful outcomes: either both DMs do nothing or Russia chooses to 
negotiate. However, state 9 represents an outcome in which Russia negotiates 
notwithstanding the Chechen Rebels’ terror. 
 
Table 6.4: Stability Analysis of the Standard Graph Model of the Chechnya Conflict 
  States 
Identical Viewpoints 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Default NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES 
Nash NO YES NO / YES NO / NO YES / / / 
GMR YES YES NO / YES YES / NO YES / / / 






SMR YES YES NO / YES YES / NO YES / / / 
Default YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Nash / NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
GMR / NO YES NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES YES 











SMR / NO YES NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES YES 
  
 
6.6.2 The Perceptual Graph Model System for the Chechnya Conflict 
For this emotion-laden conflict, the set of feasible states is further reduced, for each DM, by 
hidden and potential state sets. State 9 implies a weak government that is incapable of 
protecting its citizens against terror, which is inconceivable for the Russian government. 
Chechen Rebels will not submit to the Russian armies, and therefore for them states 2 and 5 
are hidden. Emotion, therefore, causes Russia and Chechen Rebels to have different emotive 
mapping functions, which causes inconsistency in the perception of the conflict.  As shown 
in Figure 6.7, Russia’s emotive mapping function, ,Rξ  maps the feasible set of states into 
Russia’s set of recognized states, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,12},RS =  which is perceived only by 
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Russia. The Chechen Rebels’ emotive mapping function, ,CRξ  excludes states 2 and 5, which 





Figure 6.7: DMs’ emotive mapping functions of states in the Chechnya conflict. 
 
Accordingly, the set of states privately perceived by Russia but not by Chechen Rebels is 
{2,5},PRS =  and the set of states privately perceived by Chechen Rebels and not by Russia is  
{9}.PCRS = Consequently, {1,3,4,6,7,8,10,11,12}
CS =  is the set of commonly recognized states.   
Figure 6.8 shows a perceptual graph model system, which consists of a graph model for 
each DM. Dimmed nodes and arcs indicate inconspicuous states and their associated state 
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transitions. Russia does not know that the Chechen Rebels do not see states 2 and 5, while 
the Chechen Rebels do not know that Russia is not apprehending state 9. 
 
 
Russia’s Perceptual Graph Model
Russia: R
Chechen Rebels: CR


























































































Figure 6.8: A perceptual graph model system for the Chechnya conflict. 
 
Note that the standard graph model serves as a template for building the perceptual graph 
model system. In particular, DMs’ preferences and state transitions in each perceptual graph 
model are inherited from the standard graph model. Figure 6.9 illustrates the different 
combinations of viewpoints, and thereby the different perceptual graph model systems, 
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representing the conflict model under different variants of awareness. Russia’s viewpoint is 
C P
RS S∩  when 1Rα =  and is RS  when 0.Rα =   On the other hand, Chechen Rebels’ 





















Figure 6.9: Perceptual graph model systems for different variants of awareness. 
 
6.6.3 Perceptual Stability Analysis for the Chechnya Conflict 
To analyze the perceptual graph model system of the Chechnya conflict for predicted 
resolutions, follow the two phases in Figure 6.3.  First, apply individual stability analysis 
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twice on every perceptual graph model, using the appropriate form for the solution concepts. 
Standard solution concepts are used when the owner of a graph is not aware that the 
opponent has a different graph model. Hence, the stability analysis function of the decision 
support system GMCR II (Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993; Fang, Hipel, Kilgour, and Peng, 
2003a,b) can be used to examine the stability of states for each DM.  The automatic 
identification of equilibria in GMCR II does not apply, and equilibria must be identified by 
hand using meta-stability analysis of the perceived graphs. Alternatively, perceptual solution 
concepts are used when a DM is aware that some states in his or her graph model are not 
perceived by the opponent. These perceptual solution concepts must be determined by hand. 
In either case, care must be taken to analyze only states that are recognized by the owner of 
the graph model for a focal DM. 
Stability analyses of Russia’s graph model for 1Rα =  and 0,Rα =  respectively, are 
shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, respectively.  Note that state 9, columns in grey, is not 
perceived by Russia. The states that are shown as overall stable for both DMs in Table 6.6 
are those reported as equilibria in the standard graph model analysis. However, while states 
7, 11, and 12 remain overall stable, Table 6.5 shows dramatic changes from Table 6.4 for the 
overall stability results. In particular, states 1, 3, and 6 are now perceived by Russia as GMR 
and SEQ strategic advantage unstable, since Russia can take advantage of Chechen Rebels’ 
limited perception of the more preferred states 2 and 5, and not worry about an immediate 
sanction by Chechen rebels, who do not perceive these UIs. State 3 is also perceived by 
Russia as GMR and SEQ strategic disadvantage unstable for Chechen Rebels, who have the 
incentive to move unilaterally away from state 3 to state 6 and not realize Russia’s sanction, 
state 5.  Moreover, state 9 is no longer perceived by Russia, and states 2 and 5 emerge as 
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private equilibria since they are stable under all solution concepts for Russia, when it is 
aware that Chechen Rebels do not perceive those states. 
 
Table 6.5: Stability Analysis for Russia’s Graph Model, when 1Rα =    
  States  
 
R
PS∈   
R
PS∈    
CR
PS∈     
Russia’s Viewpoint 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Default NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES  YES YES YES 
ADefualt / / / / / / / /  / / / 
Nash NO YES NO / YES NO / /  / / / 
ANash / / / / / / / /  / / / 
GMR SAUN YES SAUN / YES SAUN / /  / / / 
SEQ SAUN YES SAUN / YES SAUN / /  / / / 





ASMR / / / / / / / /  / / / 
Default YES / NO NO / NO NO NO  NO NO NO 
ADefualt / / NO NO / NO NO NO  NO NO NO 
Nash / / NO NO / YES YES NO  NO YES YES 
ANash / / NO NO / NO NO NO  NO NO NO 
GMR / / SDUN NO / YES YES NO  NO YES YES 
SEQ / / SDUN NO / YES YES NO  NO YES YES 
SMR / / NO NO / YES YES NO  NO YES YES 









ASMR / / NO NO / NO NO NO  NO NO NO  
 
Table 6.6: Stability Analysis for Russia’s Graph Model, when 0Rα =  
 States  
 
R
PS∈   
R
PS∈    
CR
PS∈     
Russia’s Viewpoint 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Default NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES  YES YES YES 
Nash NO YES NO / YES NO / /  / / / 
GMR YES YES NO / YES YES / /  / / / 




SEQ YES YES NO / YES YES / /  / / / 
Default YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO NO 
Nash / NO NO NO NO YES YES NO  NO YES YES 
GMR / NO YES NO NO YES YES NO  NO YES YES 
SMR / NO YES NO NO YES YES NO  NO YES YES 















The stability analysis finding for Chechen Rebels’ graph model are shown in Tables 6.7 and 
6.8 for the indices of awareness 1CRα =  and 0,CRα =  respectively.  Note that states 2 and 5, 
columns in grey, are not perceived by Chechen Rebels. The conclusions in the two tables are 
rather similar; with the exception of state 8 in Table 6.7, which is perceived by Chechen 
Rebels as apparently default stable for Russia, states 1, 6, 7, 11, and 12 are perceived to be 
overall stable under all solution concepts. 
 
Table 6.7: Stability Analysis for Chechen Rebels’ Graph Model, when 1CRα =  
  States  
 
R
PS∈   
R
PS∈    
CR
PS∈     
Chechen Rebels’ Viewpoint 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Default NO  NO YES  YES YES NO / YES YES YES 
ADefualt NO  NO /  / / YES / / / / 
Nash YES  NO /  / / / / / / / 
ANash NO  NO /  / / / / / / / 
GMR YES  NO /  / / / / / / / 
SEQ YES  NO /  / / / / / / / 





ASMR NO  NO /  / / / / / / / 
Default YES  NO NO  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
ADefualt /  / /  / / / / / / / 
Nash /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
ANash /  / /  / / / / / / / 
GMR /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
SEQ /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
SMR /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 




















Table 6.8: Stability Analysis for Chechen Rebels’ Graph Model, when 0CRα =  
 States  
 
R
PS∈   
R
PS∈    
CR
PS∈     
Chechen Rebels’ Viewpoint 1 2 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Default NO  NO YES  YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
Nash YES  NO /  / / NO YES / / / 
GMR YES  NO /  / / NO YES / / / 




SEQ YES  NO /  / / NO YES / / / 
Default YES  NO NO  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Nash /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
GMR /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
SMR /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 










SEQ /  NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
  
 
Moreover, a comparison of the stability analysis results in Table 6.6 (Russia’s Graph Model 
with 0Rα = ) and Table 6.7 or 6.8 shows a consensus in stability conclusions between the 
unaware Russia and Chechen Rebels. These observations suggest that the resolution of the 
conflict will be more sensitive to Russia’s perception. 
The next step is to apply meta-stability analysis to the perceptual graph model system in 
Figure 6.8, in the order shown in Figure 6.9.  Individual stability analyses for both DMs are 
arranged so that results under the four variants of awareness can be compared. Overall and 
individual stabilities are consolidated from Tables 6.6 and 6.8, Tables 6,6 and 6,7, Tables 6,5 
and 6,8, and Tables 6.5 and 6.7.   
The conclusions of the meta-stability analysis are provided in Table 6.9. Grey cells 
indicate that states are perceived stable by default for one of the DMs.  For example, in Nash 
overall stability, states 1 and 6 are perceived default stable in CRG  for Chechen Rebels in all 
variants of awareness, and states 7, 11, and 12 are perceived default stable in RG  and CRG  
for Russia in all variants of awareness. A cell labeled as “PE” indicates that the state is 
privately stable, and therefore a private equilibrium, for the DM who owns the graph model. 
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For instance, states 2 and 5 are private equilibria in all solution concepts for Russia, which is 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   



















































   
   

































Figure 6.10 summarizes the overall stability found in Table 6.9, as a function of perceptual 
graphs and variants of awareness. The meta-stability analysis reveals that each of the three 
states 7, 11, and 12, which is an equilibrium in the standard graph model, is a solid 
equilibrium under all solution concepts in all perceptual graph models. Thus, if any of these 
states is attained, it is likely to be a resolution to the conflict. These states represent outcomes 
in which Russia fights and Chechen Rebels adopt violent strategies.  
In addition, states 1 and 6 are transitory equilibria under all solution concepts except the 
Nash definition.  These states are recognized by and overall stable for both Russia and 
Chechen Rebels in some variants of awareness (when Russia has 0Rα = ). Although states 1 
and 6 represent nonviolent outcomes (either the DMs do nothing or they choose negotiation) 
and thereby may be considered desirable, their credibility is weak and their sustainability as 
resolutions to the conflict is precarious.   
States 1 and 6 are no longer equilibria (in any sense) as Russia becomes aware that the 
Chechen Rebels do not perceive states 2 and 5. Under such a circumstance, Russia’s 
awareness of the Chechen Rebels’ limited perception makes states 1 and 6 strategic 
advantage unstable for Russia, although they are overall stable in the Chechen Rebels’ graph 
model.  
Furthermore, meta-stability analysis reveals that states 2 and 5 are stable for all solution 
when 1Rα =  from Russia’s viewpoint only. States 2 and 5, therefore, become transitory 
pseudo-equilibria in Russia’s graph model under all stability definitions.  If these states are 
attained, Russia will continue fighting and not expect vengeance by the Chechen Rebels. In 
this case, then, the conclusion that states 2 and 5 are stable may mislead Russian policy 
towards Chechnya.  
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The aforementioned analysis, on the one hand, reveals a grim reality for the future of the 
Chechnya conflict. At the solid equilibria, states 7, 11, and 12, Russia and the Chechen 
Rebels continue their war of attrition. On the other hand, the existence of the two transitory 
equilibria, states 1 and 6, shows that if Russia and the Chechen Rebels are able to think two 
or three moves ahead and behave cautiously, taking into account all of each other’s possible 
moves and countermoves, and if they adopt a unified view of the conflict (a standard graph 






































6.7 Inherited Stability Properties 
A perceptual graph model system inherits most of its ingredients from a standard graph 
model. Inherited components include the DMs, states, state transitions and DMs’ relative 
preferences for states. In addition, other standard graph model features are utilized in 
reformulating standard solution concepts for use in perceptual stability analysis. These are 
the set of states DM i prefers to state s, ( )i s
+Φ , the set of states that DM i finds equally or 
less preferred to state s, ( )i s
≤Φ , and DM i’s reachable list, ( ),iR s  and unilateral 
improvement list, ( )iR s
+ .  Hence, every perceptual graph model system consists of sub-
models that share many properties with the standard graph model. 
Within the standard graph model structure, procedures have been established to assess the 
stability of states using various solution concepts (stability definitions), which are designed 
to reflect human behavior under conflict. Sometimes, mapping a standard graph model to a 
perceptual graph model may affect the stability of a state under standard solution concepts, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.11. The stability of a state for a focal DM may change because the 
state is not recognized by the owner of a graph model, or because some state transitions 
controlled by a DM in the standard graph model become invisible to that DM in the 
perceptual graph. In the former case, the stability of the state is irrelevant, because it cannot 
be assessed for stability by the owner of the graph model. But in the latter situation, either the 
stability status of the state under a particular solution concept is altered (i.e, stable state 
becomes unstable and unstable state becomes stable), or the state cannot be assessed for 
stability under the same solution concept because the DM cannot or has no desire to 
unilaterally move away from it; thereby the stability of the state is limited to perceived 
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default or Nash stability for the focal DM. In Figure 6.11, for instance, a state assessed to be 
GMR, SEQ, or SMR stable for a focal DM in a standard graph model may be assessed 
default or Nash stable if all unilateral moves or UIs, respectively, from the state are not 
perceived by the DM in the perceptual graph model. 
 
 
State in Standard Graph Model State in Perceptual Graph ModelSolution Concept




























Figure 6.11: Stability properties inherited by perceptual graph model. 
 
Hence, a state that is stable for a DM in the standard graph model may or may not be stable 
in a perceptual graph model system, from the viewpoint of the DM who perceives it. 
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Nonetheless, some solution concepts are resilient to DMs’ inconsistent perceptions of the 
conflict; in that their stability properties are preserved as the standard graph model is mapped 
into sub-models. Understanding these inherited qualities, moreover, may expedite a 
perceptual stability analysis. Most notably, Nash and SMR stability in a perceptual graph 
model system can be inferred from a stability analysis of the standard graph model. 
The rules embedded in a solution concept identify a current state that a DM may tend to 
stay at, given that the state is attained. In Nash stability, the basic rule examines whether a 
focal DM can move unilaterally to a more preferred state. Thus, the absence of unilateral 
improvements (UIs) indicates that the state is Nash stable.  Consequently, the lack of a UI in 
a standard graph model must be preserved in a perceptual graph model. Hence, if a state is 
Nash stable for a DM in the standard graph model, the state cannot be unstable in any sub-
model for that DM. 
 
Theorem 6.7.1: Persistence of Nash stability 
A state s S∈  that is Nash stable for a DM in a standard graph model maintains its stability in 
any perceptual graph model for any DM who perceives it. 
 
Proof (by contradiction): 
Suppose that k is S S∈ ¡  for , ,i j N∈  that k i= or ,k j=  and that the state s is Nash 
stable in G for DM i. Therefore, ( ) .iR s
+ = ∅  Assume that the state s is not Nash stable for 
DM i in a perceptual graph model.  Then, either ( )iR s
+ ≠ ∅  is true if 0kα =  or 
( )i kR s S
+ ≠ ∅∩  is true if 1kα = . In either case, this contradicts the assumption (in the second 
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case, because ( ) ( )i k iR s S R s
+ +⊆∩ ). Hence, ( )iR s
+ = ∅  must be true if 0kα =  and 
( )i kR s S
+ = ∅∩  must be true if 1kα = .□ 
 
In a 2-DM model, if a state is Nash stable for DM i in the standard graph model, then, in DM 
k’s perceptual graph ( 1k =  or 2k = ), it will remain Nash stable for DM i provided that k 
perceives the state and it is not default or apparently default stable. In the Chechnya conflict, 
for example, states 2, 5, and 9 are Nash stable for Russia and states 6, 7, 11, and 12 are Nash 
stable for Chechen Rebels in the standard graph model. The following observations about 
Nash stability in the sub-models are consistent with Theorem 6.7.1.  In ,RG  state 9 is not 
perceived by Russia so it is not assessed for stability for any DM; states 2 and 5 are Nash 
stable for Russia, and states 6, 7, 11, and 12 are perceived by Russia to be Nash stable for 
Chechen Rebels. In ,CRG  states 6, 7, 11, and 12 are perceived to be Nash stable for Chechen 
Rebels while state 9 is perceived Nash stable for Russia when 0CRα = . Notice that when 
Chechen Rebels are aware of Russia’s limited perception ( 1CRα = ) state 9 is not assessed for 
stability for Russia under any solution concept. 
Conversely, a state that is not Nash stable for a DM in standard graph model may or may 
not be stable in a perceptual graph system from the viewpoint of the DM who perceives it. As 
an example, state 1 is not Nash stable in the standard graph model for Russia, but it is 
perceived as Nash stable for Russia in CRG because the Chechen Rebels do not perceive the 
UI, i.e., state 1. On the other hand, state 8 is not Nash stable for Russia in the standard graph 
model, but is apparently default stable for Russia when 1CRα =  and is not Nash stable for 
Russia when 0.CRα =  
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In the SMR stability definition, the rules for identifying the stability of a state for a DM 
extend GMR stability by examining available escapes from sanctions imposed by opponents 
to all focal DM’s UIs. A perceptual graph model system inherits the inescapability property 
of sanctions from the standard graph model. In other word, the absence of escapes to all 
opponents’ sanctions must be preserved in all sub-models. Hence, a state that is SMR stable 
in standard graph model cannot be SMR unstable in a perceptual graph model system. 
 
Theorem 6.7.2: Persistence of SMR stability 
A state s S∈  that is SMR stable for a DM in a standard graph model maintains its stability 
in any perceptual graph model for every DM who perceives it. 
 
Proof (by contradiction): 
Suppose that k is S S∈ ¡  for , ,i j N∈  that k i= or ,k j=  and that the state s is Nash 
stable in G  for DM i.  Therefore, for every ( ),it R s
+∈  ( ) ( ) ,j iR t s
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩  and for all 
( ) ( ),j ih R t s
≤∈ Φ∩  ( ) ( ) .i iR h s
+Φ =∅∩  Assume that the state s  is GMR stable but not SMR 
stable for DM i in some perceptual graph model. Then, ( ) ( ) ,j iR t s
≤Φ ≠ ∅∩  and 
( ),it R s
+∀ ∈ ( ) ( ),j ih R t s
≤∀ ∈ Φ∩  either 0kα =  and ( ) ( )i iR h s
+Φ ≠ ∅∩  is true or 1kα =  and 
( ) ( )i i kR h s S
+Φ ≠ ∅∩ ∩  is true. In either case, this contradicts the assumption (in the second 
case, because ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i k i iR h s S R h s
+ +Φ ⊆ Φ∩ ∩ ∩ ). Hence, ( ) ( )i iR h s
+Φ =∅∩  must be true 
when 0kα =  and ( ) ( )i i kR h s S
+Φ =∅∩ ∩  must be true when 1kα = . If the state s  is not 
GMR stable in a perceptual graph model, s  cannot be assessed for SMR stability in the 
perceptual graph model.□ 
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In a 2-DM model, if a state is SMR stable for DM i in the standard graph model, then, in DM 
k’s perceptual graph ( 1k =  or 2k = ), it will remain SMR stable for DM i provided that k 
perceives the state and the state is GMR stable for i. To paraphrase, the following two 
conditions must be satisfied to preserve SMR stability: (1) the DM who owns the perceptual 
graph model must recognize the current state and at least one UI from it, and (2) the UI and 
any possible sanction must be recognized by all DMs. In the Chechnya conflict, for example, 
SMR stability in the standard graph model shows that states 1, 2, 5, 6, and 9 are SMR stable 
for Russia, and states 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12 are SMR stable for Chechen Rebels. In ,RG  state 
9 is not perceived by Russia so it is not assessed for stability; states 2 and 5 maintain their 
SMR stability for Russia, while states 1 and 6 maintain their SMR stability except when 
Russia is aware (i.e., 1)Rα =  that Chechen Rebels do not perceive states 2 and 5 (states 1 and 
6 cannot be assessed for SMR stability because Russia perceives them to be GMR strategic 
advantage unstable). In ,CRG  irrespective of Chechen Rebels’ awareness, states 6, 7, 11, and 
12 are perceived to be SMR stable for Chechen Rebels; states 3 and 9 are not assessed for 
SMR stability because they are not perceived by Chechen Rebels to be GMR stable. 
A state that is SMR unstable for a DM in the standard graph model may or not be stable 
in perceptual sub-models from the viewpoint of the DM who perceives it. In the Chechnya 
conflict, for example, state 1 is GMR stable for Russia in the standard graph model, but not 
always GMR stable in .RG   
On the other hand, an inference can be made about the stability of a state in the standard 
graph model from its stability in perceptual sub-models.  If a state is recognized in all 
perceptual graph models and stable for a DM for all variants of awareness, then the state 




For all ,k N∈  a state ks S∈  that is stable in kG  for DM ,i N∈  under a particular solution 
concept, must be stable in a standard graph model for DM i under that solution concept. 
 
Proof (by contradiction): 
A state ks S∈  for ,k N∀ ∈  implies that .
Cs S∈  Suppose that the state s is stable in kG for 
DM .i N∈  Then s  is perceived by every DM k to be stable for DM i. Assume that s  is not 
stable in the standard graph model for DM .i  Thus s  is not perceived by all DMs to be 
stable for DM i, which contradicts the initial assumption. Hence, state s  must be stable in 
the standard graph model for DM i. □ 
 
In the Chechnya conflict, states 6, 7, 11, and 12 are stable for the Chechen Rebels, under all 
solution concepts with the exception of default stability, in all perceptual graph models and 
all variants of awareness. These states are also stable for the Chechen Rebels in the standard 
graph model. 
Thus, if a state is recognized in all perceptual graph models and the state is unstable for a 
DM in all variants of awareness, then the state must be unstable in the standard graph model. 
For instance, in the Chechnya conflict, state 3 is unstable for Russia in ( , )R CRG G  for all 




6.8 Consistency of Stability across Perceptual Graphs 
A standard graph model represents a view common to all DMs. Because of this commonality, 
it does not matter who is doing the analysis—any interested observer or DM will apply the 
same set of rules and reach the same conclusions. Figure 6.12 illustrates the consistency of 
stability analyses in a 2-DM model. Note that GMR and SEQ are placed in the same zone 
because, except for the credible sanction condition of SEQ, their definitions are similar. The 
upper quadrants of the diagram indicate stability analyses for focal DM 1, and the lower 
quadrants of the diagram indicate stability analyses for focal DM 2.  DM 2’s stability 
conclusions for states that are assessed by DM 1 as stable or unstable for the focal DM under 
a particular solution concept are shown in the right-hand quadrants and left-hand quadrants, 
respectively. 
In a standard graph model, the conclusions DM 1 obtains from assessing the stability of 
states will be identical to DM 2’s conclusions in assessing the same states, as shown in 
Figure 6.12. For instance, if DM 1 finds a state to be Nash stable for focal DM 2, the state 
will also be Nash stable for focal DM 2 if it is 2 who carries out the analysis. Thus, a state 
analyzed by DM 1 as Nash stable for DM 2, represented by a ray that begins at the centre 
point of Figure 6.12, travels in the lower right-hand quadrant, and passes through the zone of 
Nash stability for DM 2 (first and second rings), must also pass through the zone of Nash 
stability for DM 2 in DM 2’s analysis (fourth and fifth rings).  Similarly, if DM 1 finds a 
state to be SMR unstable for focal DM 1 (upper, left-hand quadrant of the diagram) DM 2 





































Figure 6.12: Consistency of stability analyses in a standard graph model—the 2-DM 
case. 
 
This consistency of stability analyses does not apply, in general, in a perceptual graph model 
system.  The outcome of stability analysis of a commonly perceived state in a perceptual 
graph model for a focal DM may be different in the opponent’s perceptual graph model for 
that focal DM. Figure 6.13 illustrates the inconsistency of stability analyses (of commonly 
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perceived states) in a 2-DM graph model system, in which the DMs are unaware that they are 


































































































































Figure 6.13: Consistency of stability analyses in a 2-DM perceptual graph model 
system for the case of  1 20, 0.α α= =  
 
To interpret Figure 6.13, recall that commonly perceived states are being assessed for 
stability and compared across DMs’ viewpoints. Hence, states in DM 1’s perceptual graph 
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model that are recognized by both DMs are being assessed for stability in DM 1’s and DM 
2’s perceptual graph models, respectively. The difference between Figures 6.12 and 6.13 is 
that in the latter a state that is assessed by one DM to be stable (or unstable) in a graph model 
for a focal DM may be assessed by the DM’s opponent as unstable (or stable) for that focal 
DM.  In general, inconsistencies in the sets of states perceived by the DMs may affect 
stability under a particular solution concept. Thus, a state in 1G  that is assessed to be stable 
by DM 1 (upper right-hand quadrant) may change its stability status in 2.G  For instance, if 
focal DM 2  has a UI from state ,s  and that UI cannot be sanctioned by the opponent 1, then 
state s  is GMR unstable in 1G .  But, when the same state is being assessed for GMR 
stability in 2G  for focal DM 2,  state s  is GMR stable if there is a possible sanction by 1 in 
2’s privately perceived set of states, 2 .
PS  Thus, a ray that begins at the centre point of Figure 
6.13, travels in the lower left-hand quadrant, and passes through the zone of GMR instability 
for DM 2 ( first and second rings) may pass through the zone of GMR stability for DM 2 in 
DM 2’s analysis (fourth and fifth rings). Accordingly, a state that is perceived GMR unstable 
in 1G  for the focal DM 2 may be either stable or unstable in 2.G  
The consistency of stability analysis conclusions improves if at least one DM knows that 
the DMs are analyzing different graph models. In other words, if a DM becomes aware of the 
states in his or her graph model that are not perceived by the opponent, then under certain 
conditions stability analyses of commonly perceived states become more consistent across all 
perceptual graph models. Figures 6.14 and 6.15 illustrate the consistency of stability analyses 
in a 2-DM model for DMs 1 and 2, respectively. Notice that DM 1 is assumed to be aware 
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that DM 2 is analyzing a different graph but DM 2 lacks this knowledge about DM 1, i.e., 
1 2( , ) (1,0).α α =  
 
 
Figure 6.14: Consistency of stability analyses for focal DM 1 in a 2-DM perceptual 
graph model system in the case of  1 21, 0.α α= =  
SAUS: strategic advantage unstable.  
 
Recall that a commonly perceived state in 1G  is assessed by DM 1 to be default, Nash, or 
SMR stable for a focal DM iff there is, respectively, no unilateral move (UM) to and from 
the state, no UI from the state, or no escape from the opponent’s sanctions, in 1.S   DM 2’s 
stability assessment of the same state in 2G  for any of these solution concepts depends on 
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whether a UM, a UI, or an escape, respectively, is present in 2 .
PS   Hence, a state that is 
perceived by DM 1 to be stable by default, Nash, or SMR for either DM may or may not be 
perceived as stable by DM 2, as shown in right-hand quadrants of Figures 6.14 and 6.15.  
Notice that for a state to be SMR, both UIs and sanctions must be commonly recognized. 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Consistency of stability analyses for focal DM 2 in a 2-DM perceptual 
graph model system in the case of 1 21, 0.α α= =   
SAUS: strategic advantage unstable. SDUS: strategic disadvantage stable. 
 
On the other hand, a DM who is more aware has an advantage over his or her opponent. A 
commonly perceived state in 1G  is perceived by DM 1 to be default, Nash, or SMR unstable 
 
  145
for DM 2 iff  there exists a UM, a UI, or an escape to DM 1’s sanction, respectively, in .CS   
If DM 2 analyzes the same state according to these solution concepts he or she will reach the 
same conclusions, as shown in the upper left-hand quadrant of Figure 6.15. Hence, 
identifying default, Nash and SMR unstable states for DM 2 may provide DM 1 with more 
insights about DM 2’s perception. As such, DM 1 may be able make inferences about which 
states are perceived by DM 2 or about which states DM 2 finds stable under these solution 
concepts. 
Furthermore, a state in 1G  is assessed by DM 1 to be GMR stable for either DM iff  both 
the UIs and any possible sanction are commonly perceived by the DMs. By virtue of its rules, 
therefore, GMR stability must be consistent across the graph models (right-hand quadrants of 
Figures 6.14 and 6.15). But as illustrated in the lower left-hand sectors of Figures 6.14 and 
6.15, DM 1’s awareness of DM 2’s lack of perception of some states may cause a GMR 
unstable state to be GMR strategic advantage unstable (SAUS) for focal DM 1 (as in Figure 
6.14) or GMR strategic disadvantage unstable (SDUS) for focal DM 2 (as in Figure 6.15). In 
both cases, DM 2 may or may not find the state stable. 
Greater consistency of stability conclusions of DM 1 and DM 2 is achieved when both 
DMs are aware that they are analyzing different graph models, i.e., 1 2( , ) (1,1).α α =  Figures 
6.16 and 6.17 illustrate the consistency of stability analyses for focal DMs 1 and 2, 
respectively. Commonly perceived states that are assessed by DM 1 to be stable for 1 under a 
particular solution concept are also assessed by DM 2 in 2G  to be stable for 1, as shown in 
the right-hand quadrant of Figure 6.16.  For instance, a state s is perceived by DM 1 to be 
SMR stable iff  DM 1 has no escape in 1S to DM 2’s sanction. In 2 ,G  DM 2’s assessment of 
SMR stability of state s depends upon whether there is an escape for DM 1 in 2 .
PS   Thus, DM 
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2 perceives state s to be SMR stable for DM 1 if no escape exists in 2S , and apparently SMR 
stable if all escapes are in 2 .
PS   
 
 
Figure 6.16: Consistency of stability analyses for focal DM 1 in a 2-DM perceptual 
graph model system in the case of  1 21, 1.α α= =   
SAUS: strategic advantage unstable. SDUS: strategic disadvantage stable. A-stable: apparently stable. 
 
As indicated in the upper left-hand quadrants of Figure 6.16 and 6.17, DMs 1 and 2 come to 
compatible conclusions regarding a state perceived by any DM to be GMR unstable for DM 
1, because the absence of a sanction in CS is recognized by both DMs. For instance, consider 
a state s assessed by DM 1 to be GMR unstable for 1. In 2 ,G  if DM 2 has a sanction for DM 
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1’s possible UI in 2 ,
PS  then the state s is perceived by 2 to be GMR strategic disadvantage 
unstable for DM 1, as shown in the GMR/SEQ zone in the upper left-hand quadrant of Figure 
6.16. Hence, a state that is GMR unstable for DM 1 will also be perceived by DM 2 to be 
unstable for DM 1, albeit for different reasons. Similarly, consider a state s assessed by DM 1 
to be GMR unstable for DM 2, as shown in the GMR/SEQ zone in the upper left-hand 
quadrant of Figure 6.17.  If DM 2 carries out the GMR stability analysis for focal DM 2, he 
or she will find that state s is either GMR unstable or GMR strategic advantage unstable, 





Figure 6.17: Consistency of stability analyses for focal DM 2 in a 2-DM perceptual 
graph model system in the case of  1 21, 1.α α= =  
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Furthermore, a state is perceived by DM 1 to be GMR strategic advantage unstable iff  DM 1 
has a UI in 1 ,
PS  or the UI is commonly perceived by both DMs and every possible sanction 
by DM 2 belongs to 1 .
PS  Therefore, DM 2 may assess the state to be stable by default for 
DM 1 if there exists no UM in 2 ,S  or apparently stable by default if all UMs are in 2 .
PS  
Similarly, DM 2 may assess the state to be Nash stable for DM 1 if there exists no UI in 2 ,S  
or apparently Nash stable if all UIs are in 2
PS  as shown in the GMR/SEQ zone in the lower 
left-hand quadrant of Figure 6.16. 
The DMs have similar views about GMR instability of a state for focal DM 2, but they 
may not agree about who is taking advantage of the instability. The lower left-hand quadrant 
of Figure 6.17 shows that a state that is assessed by DM 1 to be GMR strategic disadvantage 
unstable is assessed by DM 2 to be GMR unstable for 2 if there is no possible sanction in 2S   
by DM 1 against 2’s UI. However, DM 2 may also perceive the state s to be GMR strategic 
disadvantage unstable if all of DM 1’s possible sanctions are in 2 .
PS  In the former case, only 
DM 1 may take advantage of the instability of the state; in the latter case, both DMs may take 
advantage of the instability.  
 
6.9 Summary 
This chapter is devoted to procedures within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution that account for inconsistencies in the perception of conflict, as a consequence of, 
for example, emotion in state identification. Perceptual graph models and a graph model 
system are defined. Then, perceptual stability analysis is developed as a two-phase approach 
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to assess the stability of states in all perceptual graph models and for all variants of 
awareness. For the 2-DM case, perceived default stability was defined, and the standard 
solution concepts of Nash, GMR, SEQ, and SMR were extended to situations in which the 
owner of a perceptual graph model is aware that other DMs do not recognize some states in 
his or her graph model. New categories of equilibria are also proposed, including definitions 
that gauge the robustness and sustainability of a equilibrium. Furthermore, the inherited 
stability properties of Nash and SMR solution concepts and the consistency of different 
stabilities across perceptual graphs are discussed for the 2-DM case. Finally, the Chechnya 




Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Strategic conflict is an inevitable phenomenon that characterizes the relational dynamics of 
individuals who perceive the attainability of their own goals to be undermined by the 
individual goal-seeking capabilities of others (Obeidi, Hipel, and Kilgour, 2005). 
Specifically, conflict is a process that commences with the establishment of an issue, and 
then evolves through stages involving both emotions and strategic choices. The Graph Model 
for Conflict Resolution constitutes a flexible, yet parsimonious, paradigm for modeling and 
analyzing strategic conflict (Kilgour, Hipel, Fang, and Peng, 2001; Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 
1993). A graph model captures all relevant components normally present in a strategic 
conflict: two or more independent, interacting DMs, courses of action that determine 




7.1 Summary of Contributions 
The centrality of emotion in conflict and the need for research on the incorporation of 
emotions into conflict analysis and resolution techniques cannot be emphasized enough. The 
main objective of this research is to advance mathematical structures and definitions that 
accurately and rigorously include perceptions and emotions within the paradigm of the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution.  Figure 7.1 shows how the major contributions of this thesis 
are embedded within the Graph Model structure.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: Major research contributions of the thesis. 
 
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to demonstrate that emotion is unquestionably an 
essential ingredient in conflict. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, it was shown that the 
isomorphism between the characteristics that define and drive conflict and those that 
engender emotions makes it appropriate to reconcile emotions with current conflict analysis 
techniques. This is because a conflict permeated with dissimilar values, beliefs, and cultures 
is more likely to engender negative emotions among stakeholders, and therefore emotions 
should be part of the conflict model.  
State identification is a crucial step in determining outcomes (states) to be considered in 
the modeling of a conflict. The proposed possibility principle advocates that emotion plays 
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an important role in determining how DMs conceptualize a conflict: by envisaging future 
outcomes and shaping conflict behavior. Attention is focused on two subsets of the 
conventional set of feasible states: the hidden states and the potential states. The hidden 
states are those states that may be invisible to a controlling DM because he or she has strong 
negative emotion, such as fear or anger; and the potential states are those states that may be 
invisible to a controlling DM because he or she lacks positive emotion, such as love and joy, 
which promotes a sense of trust and rapport among DMs. The possibility principle advances 
the modeling algorithm (Figures 2.2 and 6.1) by operationalizing the consequences of 
emotion on the actions that are perceived to be available and the actual choices that are made. 
Therefore, an accurate representation of conflict necessitates eliminating some logically valid 
states from the model to reflect the conflict as perceived by a DM.    
Embedding the possibility principle within the Graph Model framework may modify a 
DM’s directed graph by restricting the set of feasible states according to the DM’s emotion. 
Consequently, this modification in the set of feasible states may indirectly alter state 
transitions and pairwise comparisons of states that belong to all DMs. Hence, applying the 
possibility principle requires a new system for modeling and analysis, allowing for each DM 
to view the conflict independently and privately.  
Chapter 6 provides a second advance in the Graph Model methodology, including the 
development of the perceptual graph models and an associated graph model system. A 
perceptual graph model is an integrated graph model that reflects a DM’s perception and 
awareness of other DMs’ perceptions. As such, a perceptual graph model inherits its basic 
ingredients from a standard graph model, but with some modifications. Thus, a DM’s 
perceptual graph model is based upon the set of states recognized by the DM; the state 
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transitions that are wholly contained within these recognized states; and the DM’s perception 
of all DMs’ relative preferences among states. In addition, a perceptual graph model must 
reflect the DM’s knowledge of whether other DMs recognize all states in his or her model. 
Hence, an index of awareness that describes such knowledge is used to define the DM’s 
viewpoint, which guides his or her strategic behavior. Subsequently, a graph model system 
compiles all DMs’ perceptual graph models, and expresses the perspective used by every DM 
in viewing and analyzing the conflict. A combination of all DMs’ perspectives defines a 
variant of awareness for the graph model system. Therefore, for each variant of awareness a 
perceptual graph system must be defined.  
When there are discrepancies in the perception of conflict, the conventional stability 
analysis becomes ineffective in the assessment of resolutions. Chapter 6 includes another 
major contribution of this research, the development of perceptual stability analysis, as 
depicted in Figure 6.3. The underlying structure of perceptual stability analysis is an 
expansion of standard stability analysis into a two-phase approach. In Phase 1, each 
perceptual graph model is analyzed from the point of view of its owner by assessing the 
stability of perceived states for each DM in the model and using the appropriate solution 
concept. If the owner of a graph model is aware of the presence of other perceptions for the 
conflict, perceptual solution concepts are used to analyze the stability of states he or she 
perceives; whereas, if the owner of a graph model believes that there is only a single graph 
model for the conflict, only standard solution concepts are employed in the analysis. The 
newly developed perceptual solution concepts are extensions of the standard solution 
concepts Nash, GMR, SEQ, and SMR, which are applicable to the 2-DM case. Two 
important observations have been made: 1) a focal DM’s lack of perception may cause some 
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states to be apparently stable (Nash or SMR) for the DM, whereas in the standard graph 
model these states are unstable; 2) a DM’s lack of perception may generate a class of GMR 
and SEQ strategic instabilities.  
The conclusions obtained in Phase 1 are not sufficient to predict resolutions. In Phase 2 
of perceptual stability analysis, meta-stability is employed on the Phase 1 findings. This 
meta-stability analysis consolidates private and overall stabilities across all perceptual graph 
models to identify states that are equilibria, or states perceived to be overall stable in all 
graph models, and pseudo-equilibria, which are states perceived to be overall stable in some 
but not all graph models. Then, the equilibria and pseudo-equilibria thus obtained are 
consolidated across all variants of awareness to gauge the robustness and sustainability of the 
analysis. States that are equilibria in all variants of awareness are solid equilibria; states that 
are equilibria in some but not all variants of awareness are transitory equilibria. Likewise, 
similar conclusions are drawn for states that are pseudo-equilibria.     
The observations about the resilience of Nash and SMR stabilities with respect to 
inconsistent perceptions and the consistency of stability analyses across perceptual graph 
model for the 2-DM case, represent a major contribution of this research. In addition, the 
illustrative examples of the real-life disputes in Chapter 5, the US-North Korea conflict, and 
Chapter 6, the Chechnya conflict, demonstrate how these new developments can be applied 




7.2 Future Research 
Although the theoretical contributions outlined in Figure 7.1 advance the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution into a new territory in which emotion, perception and strategy are 
reconciled, there are further critical issues to be considered. Some promising research 
opportunities are as follows: 
• The general principle of the two-phase approach to perceptual stability analysis is not 
dependent on the structure of the decision problem. In other words, it can be applied 
to any conflict, whether the DMs’ perceptions are consistent or inconsistent. Thus, 
developing further case studies to guide and motivate research is crucial. 
• The perceptual solution concepts of general metarationality, symmetric 
metarationality, and sequential stability in Section 6.4 and the constructions of the 
index of awareness and viewpoint in Section 6.5.1 are exclusive to the 2-DM case. 
Hence, further extension of these perceptual solution concepts to the n-DM case, 
taking into consideration all possible sequence of opponents’ moves, will make 
perceptual stability analysis more widely applicable. As for the DMs’ index of 
awareness and viewpoints, the n-DM case requires some critical changes that 
recognize whether a DM is aware of some but not all other DMs’ perceptions. For 
example, a vector of awareness 1 2[ , ,..., ]
k k k k
i nα α α=α  could represent whether DM k 
is aware or unaware of DM i’s lack of perception of some states in .kG  A change in 
the index of awareness will subsequently alter the viewpoint construct. It is believed 
that future refinements of these two important concepts will lead to a rigorous 
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perceptual stability analysis that is applicable to conflict with complex levels of 
perception.  
• Figure 6.1 describes the direct effect of applying the possibility principle to the 
conventional set of feasible states. Only those states recognized by a DM are used in 
the DM’s perceptual graph model. It is also implied that DMs’ state transitions in the 
perceptual graph models are inherited from the standard graph model. However, state 
transitions may change in response to modifications of the set of feasible states. In 
other words, changes in state transitions could be indirect. Nonetheless, as depicted in 
Figure 6.2, it is reasonable to assume that the possibility principle may directly apply 
to the perception of state transitions, and not just alter them by proxy. In the Graph 
Model, for instance, it is usually assumed that DMs recognize all available unilateral 
movements and improvements, but this assumption may not always be valid. If the 
means for reaching a state is not apprehended, a DM will not consider moving to it. 
To illustrate, consider hostilities between two parties in which both DMs agree that it 
is important to find a resolution because they both have the right to live peacefully 
and independently. However, even though they could envisage a final and just 
resolution, the DMs may not be able to recognize the means for achieving that 
resolution. Their emotions may block them from seeing certain moves. It will be 
interesting to investigate the direct role of emotions on perceiving state transitions.    
• In Sections 5.3.2 and 6.1, it is assumed that, when the possibility principle is applied, 
the DMs’ relative preference relations among states are preserved. This assumption 
satisfies the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (Arrow, 1963). To 
illustrate, suppose a DM expresses his or her preference over the three states ,x ,y  
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and .z  If the DM prefers x to ,y  y to ,z  and x  to ,z  then the DM’s preference 
structure can be expressed by ordering the states in the form of .x y z  Suppose 
that the state z  is irrelevant, and thereby is eliminated. According to Arrow’s 
property, the DM’s preference structure will remain the same, although the pairwise 
comparisons of states will change as only x y  matters. However, as a referee for 
an article published by Obeidi, Hipel, and Kilgour (2005) commented: “In addition to 
modifying the graph model, it is plausible that the preference structure may also 
change with emotions beyond dropping preferences associated with non-visible 
states.” Thus, it appears that the possible effects of emotion in changing DMs’ 
preference structures may be a fertile venue for future research.    
• To permit a conflict analysis and resolution technique to be expeditiously used by 
practitioners and researchers, it should be implemented in a decision support system, 
(Hipel and Obeidi, 2005). The decision support system GMCR II (Hipel, Kilgour, 
Fang, and Peng, 1997; Fang, Hipel, Kilgour, and Peng, 2003a,b) allows the 
methodology of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to be applied easily to real-
world disputes. However, the advances presented in this research, particularly 
perceptual stability analysis, are yet to be implemented in a decision support system. 
Hand calculations are used in all illustrative examples presented so far, and they can 
be lengthy and tedious. In order to make the new developments accessible to users, 
they should be integrated into an updated version of GMCR II. Therefore, another 
promising future research topic is to operationalize in software the theoretical 
principles presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.       
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• To support the validity of the theoretical advances presented in Chapters 5 and 6, 
carefully designed empirical experiments or a computer simulations of the procedures 
are recommended. Experimental tests of interactive decision situations either with 
students or with other subjects can provide evidence of the applicability of the 
possibility principle and perceptual stability analysis in conflict. Computer-simulated 
tests can also help in understanding how DMs perceive outcomes and what 
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